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Research indicates that power elicits promotion focus, a motivational tendency towards 
attaining desired end states, but not prevention focus, a motivational tendency towards avoiding 
undesired end states (Higgins, 1997; Willis, 2009). Little research has examined the mechanisms 
behind this relationship. Power also elicits success expectancies (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) 
and success expectancies can intensify a promotion focus (van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). This 
suggests a mediational role for success expectations in the relationship between power and 
promotion focus. Five studies tested this prediction. The first study measured power and 
motivational tendencies. The three following studies manipulated power and then measured 
success expectancies and motivational tendencies. The final study measured power, success 
expectancies, and motivational tendencies. Evidence for the relationship between power and 
promotion focus, and for the mediating role of success expectancies, was obtained only when 
power was measured. The results indicate that relative levels of prevention and promotion may 
be more important in the relationship between power and motivation than their absolute levels, 
and that promotion and prevention focus may have distinct aspects (i.e., they may not be unitary 
phenomena) that are affected differently by feelings of power. Results also suggest an 
explanation for the greater goal focus of powerful individuals. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
People once thought that power corrupted (Kipnis, 1972). But recently, opinions about 
power seem to have improved. Perhaps this is the result of research showing that feeling 
powerful has many beneficial consequences (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & 
Liljenquist, 2008; Guinote, 2008; 2010; Rodin & Langer, 1977). In fact, recent research shows 
that feeling powerless causes more problems than feeling powerful (Ashforth, 1989; Smith, 
Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), especially where goal 
pursuit is concerned (Galinsky et al., 2008; Guinote, 2010; Willis, Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 
2010). On an intuitive level this makes sense; it’s easy to imagine driven individuals finding 
themselves in positions of power. But where does this drive come from and what sustains it? 
Doesn’t power eventually make people arrogant and lazy? Shouldn’t powerless individuals be 
equally driven to change and improve their circumstances? My research will investigate one 
reason this may not be the case, and in doing so integrate the recent power literature with a well-
known motivational theory, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). Indeed, the relationship 
between power and motivation may be more complex than was once thought. 
I will begin by reviewing the literature on power.  After  that, I will move on to the 
literature on regulatory focus theory. Next, I will discuss differences between powerful and 
powerless individuals in motivation and goal pursuit and then report the results of several studies 
designed to investigate the connections between power and regulatory focus. Finally, I will 
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discuss the implications of this research and suggest some future directions for research on this 
topic. 
1.1 POWER 
Power has been studied in many different ways. French and Raven (1959) proposed six 
separate types of power. These types include reward power, which is based on incentives, 
coercive power, which is based on punishments, legitimate power, which is based on beliefs 
about the power hierarchy, referent power, which is based on liking and respect, expert power, 
which is based on the possession of accurate information, and informational power, which is 
based on the ability to persuade others (Raven, 1965)
1
. Although this taxonomy is popular and 
has generated a tremendous amount of research (Bass, 2008), not all of that research has been 
supportive (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985). For example, factor analyses sometimes fail to 
support the existence of six types of power (Raven et al., 1998; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). 
Emerson (1962) took the study of power in a more social direction. In his social exchange 
analysis of power, he defined power as a dependency relationship between two or more actors or 
groups within a social network (not as a property of any one actor or group). According to this 
analysis, power is manifest when one actor relies on another for resources that cannot be 
obtained elsewhere. This relationship suggests some predictions about the behavior and 
outcomes of these actors and the network as a whole. For example, dependent actors in a power 
imbalanced relationship can deal with that imbalance by either capitulating (e.g., changing 
something about themselves) or resisting (e.g., withdrawing, or forming a coalition with others 
who are also dependent). Much research supports this theory (Cook & Emerson, 1978; 
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Molm,1990; 1991), including some research showing that power relations can be used to predict 
the use of different types of power (Molm, 1989), and research showing that power can result 
from successful network navigation (Burt, 1997; 2004). 
Other researchers extended the predictions made by this social exchange analysis by 
formulating a strategic-contingency model of power (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & 
Pennings, 1971; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This model focuses specifically on subgroups in 
organizations and examines outcomes at both the subgroup and organizational levels. According 
to the model, subgroups become powerful by becoming unique providers of important resources, 
thereby elevating their position in the organization. This process benefits the organization as a 
whole, because it ensures that the most effective subgroups become the most powerful (Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1974; 1977). Unfortunately, methodological problems created by studying 
idiosyncratic industries (e.g., breweries and universities) with the same paradigm stalled this line 
of research (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974; Saunders & Scamell, 1982). 
Other research in the organizational context has examined feelings of power in the 
workplace produced by empowerment programs (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Thomas & 
Velthouse, 1990). In this research, empowerment is typically viewed as a combination of impact 
(the effect that a person can have on the environment), competence (a person’s self-perceived 
proficiency at an activity), meaning (the value that an activity has for the person doing it), and 
self-determination (a person’s perceived freedom to do an activity). Individuals who have all of 
these characteristics, including managers, are more effective workers (Kanter, 1989; Spreitzer, 
1995; Spreitzer, De Janasz, & Quinn, 1999). 
However, other research has focused on the pernicious effects of power (e.g., Kipnis, 
1972). For example, Fiske (1993) thought that powerful people tend to stereotype their 
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underlings. Why?  First, powerful people often have distracting responsibilities that overtax their 
cognitive resources; using stereotypes frees some of those resources. Second, powerful people 
are motivated to maintain the status quo because that status quo has placed them in a powerful 
position. One way to perpetuate existing conditions is to assume that others lack the competence 
to be anything more than they are (see Jost, Banaji, Nosek, 2004). Ironically, Fiske speculated 
that powerless people have more accurate impressions of those who have power over them than 
powerful people do. She argued that the powerful typically control the outcomes of the 
powerless, so to have any hope of predicting and controlling those outcomes, powerless people 
need accurate information about the powerful. Although this theory has received some support 
(Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, Yzerbyt, 2000; Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000, see Fiske & 
Berdahl, 2007 for a review) recent research indicates that powerful people can form accurate (not 
stereotypical) impressions of the powerless when that knowledge helps powerful people to 
pursue their goals (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001; 2006). 
Some recent work on power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) conceptualizes it as 
control over others and focuses on the outcomes of that control. Such outcomes include attention 
to rewards, flexible cognition, and positive emotions (approach tendencies). Conversely, 
powerlessness is thought to elicit inhibitory tendencies, including attention to threats, rigid 
cognition, and negative emotions. Much research supports these ideas (see Anderson & Berdahl, 
2002; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Guinote, 2007a; 2007b; Lammers, Galinsky, 
Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; Rucker & Galinsky, 2009; Smith 
& Bargh, 2008; Smith, Jost, & Vijay, 2008; Smith et al., 2008). However, support for the link 
between powerlessness and inhibitory tendencies is generally weaker than support for the link 
between powerfulness and approach tendencies (Smith & Bargh, 2008). 
 5 
Perhaps the most important impact that Keltner et al’s (2003) analysis has had is the 
identification of powerful individuals’ greater goal focus (Galinsky et al., 2008). Powerful 
people set and pursue their goals  more effectively than do powerless people (Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Galinsky et al., 2008; Guinote, 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2010; Slabu & 
Guinote, 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008; Smith, Jostmann, et al., 2008). Guinote (2010) speculates 
that goal derailment among powerless people is due to cognitive deficits. Powerful people have a 
wider range of cognitive processes to choose from and can thus be more selective about what 
information to process. Access to these cognitive processes and increased selectivity about what 
information to process assist the powerful in their goal pursuit. 
However, Willis et al. (2010) found decreased goal persistence on the part of powerless 
individuals, which sounds more like a motivational problem. This raises two important 
questions. First, is the difference in goal focus between the powerful and the powerless entirely 
cognitive, or does it also have a purely motivational component? In addition to having greater 
cognitive ability, perhaps the powerful have stronger motivation, as well. Second, why do the 
powerful have greater motivation? Shouldn’t satisfaction and complacency come along with 
power? I will offer answers to these questions. However, before they can be answered, 
background information on several relevant topics must be considered. 
1.2 POWER AND MOTIVATION 
The finding that powerful people are more motivated to pursue their goals is not 
surprising, given their feelings of control, (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009), 
greater attention to rewards (Keltner et al., 2003), and increased approach motivation (Smith & 
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Bargh, 2008). Anyone with these characteristics would be highly motivated. But it seems like 
powerless people should also be motivated, if only to change their powerless state. Research 
indicates that people do find this state aversive (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; 
Keltner et al., 2003; Langer & Keltner, 2008; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Does any research 
show that powerless people are motivated to gain more power? 
People often seek information verifying their self views (Swann, Rentfrom, & Guinn, 
2003) and individuals’ thoughts (as opposed to their feelings) about that information may be 
especially susceptible to this effect (Moreland & Sweeney, 1984; Shrauger, 1975). However, 
when individuals suffer cognitive deficits, such as those that come with powerlessness (Guinote, 
2010), self-verification effects may not occur (Swann et al., 2003). In line with such reasoning, 
powerless people often seek more power rather than seeking to confirm their powerlessness 
(Ashforth; 1989; Bruins & Wilke, 1993, Experiment 1; Winter, 1973; Van Dijke & Poppe, 
2006). Furthermore, the desire for control, which is something powerless individuals surely 
experience, relates positively to influence attempts (Caldwell & Burger, 1997), and potentially 
antisocial attempts to regain control (Ashforth, 1989). Also, powerless people sometimes attempt 
to control their environment by seeking out patterns in random information, and they may 
engage in more superstitious behavior, perhaps to regain some small sense of control (Kay et al., 
2009; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). This desire for control may also lead the powerless to seek 
accurate information about those who control their outcomes, in the hopes of predicting the 
behavior of such persons and maybe even influencing them (Fiske, 1993). In other words, 
powerless people seem to at least have an agenda. 
Despite this, most research indicates that a powerless individual’s motivation aims only 
to gain power and does not generalize to ordinary goal pursuit, especially when people think 
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their powerlessness is legitimate (see Lammers et al., 2008; Willis et al., 2010). Powerless 
people simply seem to be less proficient at accomplishing their goals. Again, cognitive deficits 
(Guinote, 2010) provide one explanation for this problem. But recent research on motivation 
suggests another reason why powerful individuals may pursue their goals in such a committed 
way and why powerless individuals may be comparatively less committed to getting what they 
want. To understand why this is the case we must turn our attention to a recent theory of 
motivation, namely regulatory focus theory. 
1.3 REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY 
Regulatory focus refers to an individual’s preferred goal pursuit strategy (Higgins, 1997). 
Regulatory focus theory grew out of self-discrepancy theory (see Higgins, 1987), which claims 
that people experience negative affect when their actual self (who they believe they are) falls 
short of either their ideal self (who they or a significant other hope they will be) or their ought 
self (who they or a significant other feel they should be). Discrepancies between the actual self 
and ideal self cause people to feel sad and dejected, whereas discrepancies between the actual 
self and the ought self cause people to feel anxious and fearful.  People can experience either 
kind of self-discrepancy chronically or as a result of situational factors. Furthermore, people can 
experience both discrepancies strongly (or weakly), or they can experience one kind more 
strongly than the other. In principle, self discrepancies operate independently, although in 
practice there is often a positive correlation between the extents to which people experience each 
of these self-discrepancies (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). 
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Regulatory focus theory expands self-discrepancy theory to explain peoples’ motivational 
tendencies (Higgins, 1997). According to regulatory focus theory, people can experience two 
types of motivation, namely a promotion focus (motivation to attain desired states), or a 
prevention focus (motivation to avoid undesired states). These motivational states affect 
responses to success and failure. A promotion focus makes people feel cheerful and happy after 
attaining a desired state, and sad or dejected after failing to attain such a state. Conversely, a 
prevention focus makes people feel calm and relaxed after successfully avoiding an undesired 
state, and anxious or fearful after failing to avoid such a state.  Much like self-discrepancies, an 
individual’s regulatory focus can be dispositional or situational, though the effects of regulatory 
focus are strongest when dispositional and situational circumstances match (Shah, Higgins, & 
Friedman, 1998). However, when a regulatory focus is primed in a situation, that focus will 
typically determine a person’s motivation. Some individuals have more of one focus than the 
other, but like self-discrepancies, promotion and prevention foci operate independently; a person 
can be high or low in both, or high in one and low in the other. In light of this fact, researchers 
typically classify people according to their predominant regulatory focus (Idson, Liberman, 
Higgins, 2000). 
There are further implications of this theory. People prefer to use goal attainment 
strategies that fit their regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997; 2000). People with a promotion focus 
prefer using approach strategies to attain the things that they want, whereas people with a 
prevention focus prefer using avoidance strategies to avoid the things that they fear. In fact, 
when people are able (or forced) to use focus-fitting strategies, they pursue goals more 
vigorously than when they use strategies that do not fit their focus (Forster, Higgins, Idson, 1998; 
Higgins, 2000; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). In other words, their motivation 
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increases. This may occur because they place greater value on related goals and experience 
related emotions more strongly (Higgins, 2000; 2005; 2006). 
Perhaps most important for the current analysis is the finding that the expectation of  
success or failure can also “fit with” a person’s regulatory focus and therefore maintain and 
increase that focus (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2004). People in a promotion focus experience 
success, anticipated success, and the emotions associated with success (cheerfulness and 
happiness) more intensely than they experience failure and the emotions associated with failure 
(Forster, Grant, Idson, Higgins, 2001; Idson et al., 2000; 2004). So, for people in a promotion 
focus, success (often called promotion success) increases motivation far more than does failure 
(van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Alternately, people in a prevention focus experience failure, 
anticipated failure, and the emotions associated with failure (fearfulness and anxiety) more 
intensely than they experience success and the emotions associated with success (Forster et al., 
2001; Idson et al., 2000; 2004). So, for people in a prevention focus, failure (often called 
prevention failure) increases motivation more than success (van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). This 
occurs in part because happiness and anxiety, the emotions associated with promotion success 
and prevention failure, respectively, are higher intensity emotions than dejection and quiescence, 
the emotions associated with promotion failure and prevention success, respectively. 
1.4 CONNECTIONS BEWTEEN REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY AND POWER 
Interestingly, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), and the conceptualization of 
power offered by Keltner and his collegues (2003), have many theoretical and empirical 
connections. Others have speculated about a relationship between power and regulatory focus 
 10 
(Guinote, 2008; 2010; Keltner et al., 2003; Maner, Kaschak, & Jones, 2010; Willis, 2009; Willis 
& Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010), but is has received little empirical attention (see Willis, 2009; Willis 
& Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010 for exceptions). Perhaps they have not been studied because neither 
promotion nor prevention focus appear to give people a general advantage in goal pursuit, the 
way powerfulness confers an advantage over powerlessness. However, there is reason to expect 
that the effects of regulatory focus and power are not similar in regard to goal pursuit. This point 
will be discussed shortly. 
Why should power and regulatory focus be related? Powerful people attend to rewards 
and may associate power with the ability to attain those rewards (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 
2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008). Attending to rewards can create a promotion focus (Idson et al., 
2000). The feelings of eagerness that come with this focus can then generalize to other 
opportunities for rewards (Forster & Friedman, 2004; Higgins, 1997; 2006; Idson et al., 2004). 
This situation should foster a promotion focus in powerful individuals. 
Only a small amount of research has provided direct evidence for the relationship 
between power and a promotion focus. For example, Willis (2009) manipulated power using an 
essay prompt (i.e., Galinsky et al., 2003) and measured regulatory focus using both reaction 
times to list concepts relevant to promotion and prevention focus and also goals relevant to 
promotion or prevention focus. Willis’s results indicated a positive relationship between power 
and promotion focus, yet found no significant relationship between power and prevention focus. 
Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón (2010) found similar results when participants were led to believe 
they would be in charge of another individual (to manipulate power) and they viewed this power 
as legitimate. However, the indirect evidence for that relationship is considerable. Power levels 
and regulatory foci share many outcomes. For example, people who feel powerful (Anderson & 
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Galinsky, 2006; Lammers et al., 2008), and people with a promotion focus (Bryandt & Dumford, 
2008; Higgins, 2002; Crowe & Higgins, 1997), take more risks. And powerful people are more 
creative (Galinsky et al., 2008), much like those with a promotion focus (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997; Friedman & Forster, 2001). Powerful people attend to the global features of stimuli and 
use broad categorizations (Forster, 2009; Smith & Trope, 2006), as do those with a promotion 
focus (Forster, 2009; Forster & Higgins, 2005).  And both powerful people (Fast et al., 2009) and 
people with a promotion focus (Langens, 2007) overestimate their control in situations. Power 
relates positively to optimism (Anderson & Galisnky, 2006; Fast et al., 2009), and so does 
promotion focus (Forster et al., 2001; Grant & Higgins, 2003). Power (relative to powerlessness) 
increases cognitive functioning (Guinote, 2007a; 2010; Smith, Jostmann, et al., 2008), and 
promotion focus has similar effects (Friedman & Forster, 2005). Power (Keltner et al., 2003; 
Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Maner et al., 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008) and promotion 
focus (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001; Summerville & Roese, 2008) 
are both positively related to approach tendencies. Finally, powerful people experience strong 
positive emotions (Berdahl & Mortorana, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003; Langner & Keltner, 2008; 
Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Similarly, people with a promotion focus experience 
positive emotions more strongly than negative emotions (Idson et al., 2000). 
What about powerlessness and prevention focus? Powerless people should attend more to 
threats in their environment (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008). So, 
following the same logic as above, this should cause a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997; Idson et 
al., 2000). However, previous research has not found a direct relationship between powerlessness 
and prevention (Willis, 2009; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010). And there is much less indirect 
evidence for this relationship than there is for the relationship between powerfulness and 
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promotion (but see Friedman & Forster, 2005; Smith, Jostmann, et al., 2008). For these reasons, 
the relationship between powerlessness and prevention focus is less clear. Why might this be the 
case? 
1.5 THE ASYMMETRICAL EFFECTS OF POWER ON PROMOTION AND 
PREVENTION FOCUS 
There is reason to think that power affects promotion focus to a greater extent than it 
affects prevention focus. Powerful people expect success in their endeavors. This is due to 
several factors. Power makes people feel optimistic, in control, and confident (Galinsky, Jordan, 
& Sivanathan, 2008; Fast et al., 2009; See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011) and increases their 
self-efficacy (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). For example, See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll 
(2011) had participants write an essay about a time they felt powerful or powerless (i.e., 
Galinsky et al., 2006), and then measured their confidence in estimates of tuition costs that they 
had made for different colleges. Participants who felt powerful expected their estimates to be 
more accurate. People who feel dispositionally powerful also tend to have an internal locus of 
control (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). Framed in terms of regulatory focus theory, 
powerful people should anticipate success in attaining rewards in their environment. The 
outcomes that powerless people anticipate are less clear. When people feel less powerful, they 
expect their outcomes to be determined by others (Fiske, 1993), or by environmental factors. 
This does not necessarily imply failure; the forces that surround powerless people can be 
benevolent. It does, however, imply that powerless people cannot control their outcomes and that 
they often do not know what outcomes to expect. Indeed, research on the relationship between 
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power and confidence indicates that feeling powerful causes a large increase in confidence, but 
feeling powerless causes only a small (and statistically non-significant) decrease in confidence 
(See et al., 2011). 
What does this mean for goal pursuit? As mentioned earlier, promotion success and 
prevention failure both increase motivation (Idson et al., 2000; 2004). Anticipated success 
increases motivation and amplifies emotions for those with a promotion focus and anticipated 
failure increases motivation and amplifies emotions for those with a prevention focus. However, 
success does not increase motivation and amplify emotions for those in a prevention focus and 
failure does not increase motivation and amplify emotions for those in a promotion focus (Idson 
et al., 2004; van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). 
These different reactions to success and failure, when taken together with the 
motivational changes that come along with feelings of power, could explain the superior goal 
focus of powerful individuals. If anticipating success is more motivating for people in a 
promotion focus, and powerful individuals (who are in a promotion focus) anticipate success, 
then powerful people should have stronger motivation than powerless people. This is because 
powerful people are placed in a state of promotion success by their expectations of successful 
goal pursuit. Compared to powerful people, powerless people should have weaker motivation 
because they do not enjoy a motivational boost from anticipating failure, which could create a 
state of prevention failure if it occurred. This is because the magnitude of the confidence 
suppression that comes with powerlessness is not as large as the magnitude of the confidence 
boost that comes with powerfulness (e.g., See et al, 2011). 
Interestingly, some research on power finds stronger results for feelings of powerfulness 
than for feelings of powerlessness (Berdahl & Mortorana, 2006; Chen, Langer, Mendoza-
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Denton, 2009; Smith & Bargh, 2008). This may be an artifact of the relationship between 
powerfulness and success expectations. Powerful individuals may naturally have a “magnified” 
promotion focus due to their expectations of success. This magnification may make the effects of 
powerfulness stronger than the effects of powerlessness. 
1.6 DISPOSITIONAL AND SITUATIONAL POWER 
The existing research on the relationship between power and regulatory focus (i.e., 
Willis, 2009; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010) manipulated power in order to examine the 
effects of power on regulatory focus. However, one topic that has been neglected is the 
distinction between power that is felt as a result of situation (e.g., the kind of power felt by a 
child who is made hall monitor for the day) and power that is experienced naturally as part of 
one’s idiosyncratic personality. Indeed, regulatory focus can also arise as a result of situational 
pressures or exist naturally as a dispositional tendency. The effects of situationally induced and 
dispositional power are typically the same (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006; Cote, Kraus, Cheng, Oveis, van der Lowe, Lian, & Keltner, 2011; Rucker & 
Galinsky, 2009, but see Chen et al., 2009), as are the effects of situationally induced and 
dispositional regulatory focus (Forster, 2009; Forster et al., 1998; Higgins et al., 1997).  And 
there is little reason to predict that the relationship between power and regulatory focus should 
be different depending on whether that power is situational or dispositional. Nonetheless,  
investigating the proposed relationships at both the dispositional and situational levels will 
increase the generality of these results and provide valuable information about boundary 
conditions on the power/regulatory focus relationship. 
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1.7 MY RESEARCH 
Previous investigations into the relationship between power and regulatory focus have 
been few and far between, making replication desirable. Furthermore, the previous investigations 
manipulated power and then measured regulatory focus. Thus, this research will begin by 
investigating the relationship between power and regulatory focus when power is measured as a 
personality trait rather (rather than manipulated in an experimental context). After establishing 
that this relationship exists for dispositional power, the research will move on to investigate it in 
situational format. 
1.7.1 Hypothesis #1 
Individuals who feel powerful will display a stronger promotion focus than individuals 
who feel powerless. 
The expectation of success has never been examined for its catalytic effects on the 
relationship described in Hypothesis #1. Because promotion success increases motivation and 
strengthens a promotion focus, expectation of success should mediate the relationship between 
powerfulness and promotion focus (see Figure 1). Based on this analysis, I have generated two 
additional hypotheses: 
1.7.2 Hypothesis #2 
Individuals who feel powerful will be more likely than individuals who feel powerless to 
expect successful goal pursuit. 
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Figure 1: Power predicts an increase in promotion focus and also an increase in expectations of 
success (H1 and H2). However, expectations of success should mediate the relationship between power and 
promotion (H3). 
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1.7.3 Hypothesis #3 
The expectation of goal success will mediate the relationship between feelings of power 
and promotion focus. 
These hypotheses were investigated over the course of five studies. Study 1 examined the 
previously uninvestigated relationship between dispositional power and dispositional regulatory 
focus. Studies 2 through 4 manipulated power and examined its effects on expectations of 
success and regulatory focus in an effort to uncover a mediational role for expectations of 
success. Study 5 measured power, expectations of success, and regulatory focus in an effort to 
uncover the mediating role of expectations of success when examining these variables at a 
dispositional level. 
 18 
2.0  STUDY 1 
The purpose of the first study was to see if the relationship between manipulated power 
and situational regulatory focus generalizes to dispositional power and dispositional regulatory 
focus. This study employed several scales to test for this relationship: the Generalized Power 
Scale (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), the Regulatory Focus Scale (Fellner, Holler, Kirchler, & 
Schabmann, 2007), and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2003). 
2.1 DESIGN 
This study followed a correlational design. 
2.2 PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and ten students taking Introduction to Psychology participated in this study 
in exchange for course credit. Forty students were male and 70 were female. One participant 
provided data that was incomplete. Including this participant made no difference in the analyses 
except where noted. Gender made no difference in the analyses except where noted. 
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2.3 MEASURES AND PROCEDURE 
Participants completed one questionnaire measuring dispositional power, the Generalized 
Power Scale (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Participants were asked to rate statements on a 1 to 7 
scale with “Disagree strongly” and “Agree strongly” as the endpoint anchors and “Neither agree 
nor disagree” as the midpoint anchor (see Appendix A). This scale contains eight items and, 
after reverse-scoring four items, each participant’s score was determined by summing the item 
scores and dividing by eight. Participants also completed two questionnaires measuring 
dispositional regulatory focus, the Regulatory Focus Scale (RFS) (Fellner et al., 2007), found in 
Appendix B, and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz, 2003), found in Appendix 
C. Each of these scales measures both prevention and promotion focus on a separate scale. The 
RFS asks participants to respond to statements such as “Rules and regulations are helpful and 
necessary for me” on a 1 to 7 scale with “definitely untrue” and “definitely true” as endpoint 
anchors and “neither true not untrue” as a midpoint anchor. The RFS contains 10 items with five 
items for the RFS prevention and five items for the RFS promotion subscales. One item is 
reverse scored on each scale. Each participant’s RFS promotion and RFS prevention score was 
determined by summing the item scores for each subscale and dividing by five. The PVQ asks 
participants to read descriptions of different hypothetical individuals, such as “Thinking up new 
ideas and being creative is important to this person. This person likes to do things in his/her own 
original way” and then respond on a 1 to 6 scale whether the individual is “not like me at all” or 
“very much like me.” The PVQ contains 20 items with seven items for the PVS promotion 
subscale and 13 items for the PVQ prevention subscale. Each participant’s PVQ promotion score 
was determined by summing the item scores for each promotion subscale and dividing by seven.  
A PVQ prevention score for each participant was determined by summing the item scores for 
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each prevention subscale and dividing by 13. Additionally, participants completed the BAS/BIS 
scale (Carver & White, 1994) to measure both approach and inhibitory tendencies (see Appendix 
D). For this scale, again, participant read statements such as, “If I think something unpleasant is 
going to happen I usually get pretty ‘worked up’” and responded on a 1 to 4 scale with 
“Disagree” and “Agree” as anchors. The BAS/BIS Scale contains 20 items with seven items for 
the BIS subscale (two items are reverse coded) and 13 items for the BAS subscale. Each 
participant’s BIS score was determined by summing the item scores for each BIS subscale and 
dividing by seven.  Similarly, a BAS score for each participant was determined by summing the 
item scores for each BAS subscale and dividing by 13.  Participants were run in groups of up to 
10 and the scales were counterbalanced (i.e., the order in which the participants received the 
scales was systematically varied to eliminate any effects created by completing the scales in any 
particular order). After completing the questionnaires, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for these data can be found in Table 1. All scales achieved adequate 
reliability (Chronbach’s alphas of .70 or higher) except for the promotion PVQ and the 
prevention RFS, which each had lower reliability (Chronbach’s alphas of .63 and .61 
respectively), and the promotion RFS, which had very low reliability (Chronbach’s alpha = .49). 
The fact that these scales were not developed specifically for use in an American sample (Fellner 
et al., 2007; Schwartz, 1994) may explain these low reliabilities. It is possible that linguistic  
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Table 1: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
       
 M/SD    1    2    3   4  5  6 7 
1. General Power 
4.99/.85  .83       
2. Promotion PVQ 
4.47/.64  .23*  .63      
3. Prevention PVQ 
4.01/.75 -.05 -.29**  .82     
4. Promotion RFS 
4.08/.76  .01  .47** -.45**  .49    
5. Prevention RFS 
5.84/.76  .18  .01  .36** -.31** .61   
6. BAS 
3.14/.34  .23*  .40** -.03  .09 .26** .75  
7. BIS 
3.17/.50 -.23* -.29**  .20* -.42** .33** .04 .76 
Note. Chronbach’s alpha are listed where rows and for each scale columns cross. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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connotations in the language of origin may not be replicated in the English translation, and that 
these connotations are be necessary for accurate measurement. The promotion PVQ and 
promotion RFS were significantly correlated (r = .47, p = .001), as were the prevention PVQ and 
prevention RFS scores (r = .36, p = .001). This demonstrates good criterion validity on the part 
of these scales. Consistent with previous research (Keltner et al., 2003; Lammers et al., 2009; 
Maner et al., 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008), general power was positively correlated with 
behavioral approach (r = .23, p = .015). Interestingly, general power was negatively correlated 
with behavioral inhibition (r = -.23, p = .016), a finding that contradicts previous research (Smith 
& Bargh, 2008), but is consistent with previous theorizing on power (Keltner et al., 2003). The 
promotion PVQ scale was positively related to approach tendencies (r = .40, p = .003), which is 
also consistent with previous research (Higgins et al., 2001; Summerville & Roese, 2008). 
However, the promotion RFS scale was not significantly related to approach tendencies. Both the 
prevention PVQ (r = .20, p = .039) and RFS (r = .33, p = .001) were significantly related to 
inhibitory tendencies. 
2.4.2 Analysis 1: Hypothesis #1 
To create a regulatory focus index, where higher scores would indicate more promotion 
focus, the prevention scores were subtracted from the promotion scores for both the PVQ and the 
RFS. This procedure has been used to determine regulatory focus in the past (Idson et al., 2000). 
The General Power Scale was marginally positively related to the regulatory focus PVQ index (r 
= .17, p = .08), however, this relationship became non-significant when gender was taken into 
account (β = .16, p = .102). The General Power Scale was also unrelated to the regulatory focus 
RFS index (r = -.11, p = .26). Because of the inherent problems created by using difference 
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scores, such as low reliability and the conflation of variance contributed by the score components 
(Edwards, 1995), the component scales of each index were also examined. The General Power 
Scale was also significantly related to the promotion (r = .23, p = .014), but not to the prevention 
(r = -.05, p = .598) PVQ scale. The promotion RFS was not significantly related to power (r = 
.01, p = .916). However, the prevention RFS was marginally positively related to general power 
(r = .18, p = .054) and this relationship became significant when the participant who provided 
incomplete data was not included. These results partially supported Hypothesis #1. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The results of Study 1 were encouraging and offered partial support for the contention 
that dispositional power is related to dispositional regulatory focus in a way similar to that found 
for manipulated power. However, the lack of a relationship between the RFS index, and the 
positive correlation between the General Power Scale and the RFS prevention scale were 
unexpected. This strange result may be due in part to the low reliability of the RFS prevention 
scale, and also to the fact that the RFS was developed for use in a non-English speaking 
population (Fellner et al., 2007). Given the encouraging results of Study 1, Study 2 was done to 
replicate the previously found relationship between manipulated power and situational regulatory 
focus (Willis, 2009; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010), and to test for the mediating role of 
success expectancies. Participants’ feelings of power were manipulated and then, as part of a 
supposed second study, their regulatory focus and expectations about goal completion were 
measured. 
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3.0  STUDY 2 
3.1 DESIGN 
This experiment followed a 3-way (Power Level: Powerful vs. Control vs. Powerless) 
between-subjects design. 
3.2 PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and forty three students taking Introduction to Psychology participated in 
this study in exchange for course credit. Sixty students were male and 82 were female (and one 
chose not to report his or her gender). One participant arrived late and did not complete the 
power manipulation. So, this participant was excluded from all analyses. One participant 
provided information that was incomplete and two participants expressed suspicion during the 
debriefing. However, excluding these participants from analyses made no difference in the 
results. So, these participants were retained in the sample. Gender made no difference in the 
analyses, except where noted. 
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3.3 POWER MANIPULATION 
As in previous investigations (Willis, 2009), power was manipulated by having 
participants recall a time they felt powerful or powerless, or (as a control condition) their latest 
trip to the grocery store (Galinsky et al, 2003). In the powerful condition, they were asked to 
“Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or 
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person 
or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. 
Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how you felt, etc.” In 
the powerless condition, they were asked to “Please recall a particular incident in which 
someone had power over you. By power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over 
your ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe 
this situation in which you did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.” Following 
each prompt, participants were provided with space to record their memories. This manipulation 
is very simple and has been used more than 100 times in the power literature (A. Galinsky, 
personal communication, September 9, 2010). 
3.4 REGULATORY FOCUS AND GOAL EXPECTANCIES 
I determined participants’ regulatory foci by examining the types of goals that they 
generated for themselves. This measure (or one quite similar) has been used successfully to 
assess regulatory focus in the past (Pennington & Roese, 2003; Willis, 2009; Willis & 
Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010). It allows participants flexibility in responding and directly taps the 
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most important aspect of regulatory focus, namely the nature of the goals that people generate for 
themselves. Furthermore, several methods exist for determining whether the listed goals are 
promotion or prevention goals (see Analysis #2). I also measured the extent to which participants 
thought they had the ability to accomplish those goals, their perceived likelihood of 
accomplishing those goals, and their confidence in these estimates. 
3.5 PROCEDURE 
Participants were brought into the laboratory in groups of ten. They were greeted by a 
student who introduced himself or herself an undergraduate who was collecting data for a 
directed research project. This undergraduate then told them that they would be taking part in 
two separate studies, one regarding their memory for past events and another regarding life 
goals. The participants were told that the studies had nothing to do with each other, but were 
being conducted together for the sake of convenience and efficiency
2
. 
3.5.1 Manipulation of Power 
Next, the student told participants that she or he would be conducting the first study and 
then gave out Galinsky et al.’s (2003) power manipulations. The power manipulations were in 
colored folders. After the participants finished these manipulations, the student asked them to 
look over their essays and make any changes they felt their essays needed. They were given ten 
minutes to write the essay. 
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3.5.2 Manipulation Check 
After that, participants were given a questionnaire assessing how powerful (powerless) 
they felt in the situation they had described. Specifically, they were asked if they felt “in 
control,” “free from constraints,” “weak,” and “able to do what they wanted” in that situation. 
All ratings were made on a 0 to 6 scale, with “not at all” and “completely” as anchors. After that, 
the student probed the participants for suspicion, asking them what they thought the research 
hypotheses were, and thanked them for participating in his or her study. 
3.5.3 Measurement of Regulatory Focus 
Next, the student turned the session over to the main experimenter, who arrived after the 
study had begun, giving the appearance that he was not involved in it. He explained that this 
project involves “the life goals that college students set for themselves and the variables that are 
related to these goals.” Next, he distributed a “prevention” goal list sheet (titled “Goal sheet A” 
and found in Appendix E), a “promotion” goal list sheet (titled “Goal sheet B” and found in 
Appendix F), and 20 goal information sheets (found in Appendix G). 
These materials (which were, in fact, the measures of regulatory focus and goal 
expectations) were prepared to look very different from the materials used earlier in the study, to 
create the illusion that a different person had prepared them (different fonts for the text, slightly 
differently colored paper, differently colored folders, and different handwriting on the folders). 
On the “prevention” goal list sheet, participants were asked to list up to 10 personal goals that 
they “feel responsible for accomplishing” in the coming two years. On the “promotion” goal list 
sheet, participants were asked to list up to 10 personal goals that they “would enjoy 
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accomplishing” in the coming two years. The order of these two questionnaires was 
counterbalanced. After listing their goals, the participants were asked a series of questions about 
each goal on their goal sheets. These questions were on the goal information sheets. Participants 
completed one goal information sheet for each goal listed on their “prevention” goal list sheet or 
their “promotion” goal list sheet. 
Questions on the goal information sheet included how much each goal focused on 
“getting something you want” (Question #1) and how much each goal focused on “avoiding 
something you don’t want” (Question #2). These two questions are based on questions used by 
Pennington and Roese (2003) to measure regulatory focus. Furthermore, participants were asked 
how likely they thought it was that they would be able to accomplish each goal (Question #3), 
and the extent to which they had the ability to accomplish each goal (Question #5). They were 
also asked how confident they felt about their responses to each of those questions (Questions #4 
and #6). Responses were always on 0 to 6 scales. No order effects were anticipated, but to 
control for such effects, participants received the questions in a Balanced Latin Square Design
3
. 
Participants were given up to 20 minutes to complete the questionnaires. 
Next, they were given a questionnaire regarding how they currently felt with regard to 
several emotions that should be related to regulatory focus, namely happiness, satisfaction, 
anxiety, and dejection. All of the emotion ratings were made on 0 to 6 scales with “not at all” 
and “completely” as anchors. Finally, participants were probed for suspicions regarding the 
deception used in the study, asked what the research hypotheses were
4
, debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
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3.6 RESULTS 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. Promotion and prevention focus were 
measured by the number of promotion and prevention goals that participants listed. The 
determination of whether a goal was a promotion or prevention goal was made in two different 
ways. First, it was made by counting the number of goals listed on the promotion and prevention 
goal list sheets. Second, it was made by whether participants rated each goal as getting 
something he or she wanted (promotion) or avoiding something she or he didn’t want 
(prevention). If a goal was rated as being equally focused on getting something wanted and 
avoiding something unwanted, then it was coded as a promotion goal if it was written on the 
promotion goal list sheet or as a prevention goal if it was listed on the prevention goal list sheet. 
Measures of promotion and prevention focus were correlated across these different measures (r = 
.73, p = .001 and r = .38, p = .001, respectively), which indicated good construct validity. The 
number of goals listed on participants’ promotion goal list sheets was positively correlated with 
the number of goals listed on participants’ prevention goal list sheets (r = .53, p = .001), which 
corresponds to previous research (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005). However, the number 
of goals that participants rated as promotion goals was negatively correlated with the number of 
goals that participants rated as prevention goals (r = -.24, p = .004), probably because the more 
goals that participants rated as promotion goals, the fewer were left to be rated as prevention 
goals (and vice versa). Participants’ ratings of how likely they were to accomplish each goal and 
their ratings of whether they had the ability to accomplish each goal were both negatively 
correlated to the number of goals participants listed on both their promotion (r = -.27, p = .001  
 30 
 
Table 2: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
         
   M/SD 1 2 3 4 5 6     7    8 9 
1. Manipulation check 
 
3.47/1.55          
2. Promotion Focus  
(number of goals) 
5.95/2.11 .09         
3. Prevention Focus 
(number of goals) 
5.34/2.07 -.04 .53**        
4. Promotion Focus   
(ratings of goals) 
8.78/3.37 .02 .73** .66**       
5. Prevention Focus   
(ratings of goals) 
2.45/2.24 .02 .28** .38** -.24**      
6. Likelihood of goal 
accomplishment 
4.49/.61 -.01 -.27** -.33** -.15 -.29**     
7. Confidence about #6 
 
4.67/.79 -.02 -.03 -.16 -.03 -.09 .55**    
8. Ability to accomplish 
goals 
4.91/.60 -.03 -.25** -.27** -.16 -.20* .70** .46**   
9. Confidence about #8 4.90/.73 -.01 -.12 -.20* -.09 -.09 .50** .85** .65**  
*p < .05. **p < .01.    
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and r = -.25, p = .002, respectively) and prevention (r = -.33, p = .001 and r = -.27, p = .001, 
respectively) goal list sheets. This is may be due to the fact that the more goals participants 
listed; the fewer resources they had to accomplish each goal (see discussion below). The number 
of goals that participants rated as prevention goals was also negatively correlated with their 
ratings of how likely they were to accomplish each goal (r = -.29, p = .001) and their ratings of 
their ability to accomplish each goal (r = -.20, p = .02), perhaps because thoughts about 
accomplishing prevention goals should not be very motivating (Idson et al., 2000). Participants’ 
ratings of how likely they were to accomplish each goal were positively correlated with their 
ratings of their ability to accomplish each goal (r = .70, p = .001), perhaps because these 
questions were conceptually similar. Additionally, participants’ ratings of their confidence in 
response to the questions about both their likelihood of goal accomplishment and their ability to 
accomplish each goal were positively correlated with their responses to the questions about 
likelihood of goal accomplishment and ability to accomplish each goal (r = .85, p = .001). Again, 
this may have occurred because these questions tap similar concepts.  
3.6.2 Analysis 1: Manipulation Check 
A scale created from the composite of the four manipulation check questions achieved 
adequate reliability (Chronbach’s Alpha = .86). A one-way ANOVA on this scale yielded a main 
effect of power (F(2, 139) = 67.51, p = .001). Participants who wrote about a time they felt 
powerful (M = 4.28, SD = .93) reported feeling more powerful in that situation than did 
participants who wrote about a time they felt powerless (M = 1.95, SD = 1.02) and participants in 
the control condition (M = 4.20, SD = 1.34)
 5
. A Tukey Test indicated that the powerless group 
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was significantly different from the control group, but that the powerful group was not. This 
constituted a partial failure of the manipulation check. 
3.6.3 Analysis 2: Hypothesis #1 
In order to create a regulatory focus index, the number of prevention goals that 
participants listed was subtracted from the number of promotion goals that they listed. Higher 
scores on this index indicate a stronger promotion focus. A one-way ANOVA on this index 
yielded a main effect of power (F(2, 139) = 4.52, p = .013). A Tukey Test indicated that 
participants in the control group (M = 1.32, SD = 1.96) had a significantly stronger promotion 
focus than those in both the powerful (M = .34, SD = 1.62) and powerless groups (M = .19, SD = 
2.30), which did not differ from each other. Again, due to the inherent problems with using 
difference scores as dependent measures (Edwards, 1995) and to further examine these 
relationships, a (2) (Regulatory Focus: Promotion vs. Prevention) x 3 (Power Level: Powerful vs. 
Powerless vs. Control) mixed ANOVA analyzed the number of promotion and prevention goals 
participants listed separately (instead of using the index). This analysis yielded several 
significant affects. The main effect of power on number of goals listed was significant (F(2, 139) 
= 3.55, p = .032). A Tukey Test indicated that powerful participants (M = 12.38, SD = 4.11) 
listed significantly more goals overall than did powerless participants (M = 10.48, SD = 3.27). 
However, the difference between powerful and control participants (M = 11.02, SD = 3.65) was 
not significant. A main effect of regulatory focus (F(1, 139) = 13.65, p = .001) indicated that 
participants listed more promotion goals (M = 5.95, SD = 2.10) than prevention goals (M = 5.34, 
SD = 2.07). Finally, the ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between power and regulatory 
focus (F(2, 139) = 4.52, p = .013), but simple effects testing indicated that the interaction was 
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driven only by the control condition, where participants listed more promotional goals (M = 6.17, 
SD = 2.03) than prevention goals (M = 5.34, SD = 2.07). Taken together, these results did not 
support Hypothesis #1. 
 An additional regulatory focus index was created by coding each goal as promotion or 
prevention based on the rating that participants gave these goals on their goal information sheets.  
Then, the number of prevention goals was again subtracted from the number of promotion goals. 
A one-way ANOVA on this index was not significant (F(2, 129) = .01, p = .99); powerful (M = 
6.38, SD = 4.37), powerless (M = 6.35, SD = 4.65), and control (M = 6.26, SD = 4.47) 
participants all had about the same index scores. Again, to further explore the data, a (2) 
(Regulatory Focus: Promotion vs. Prevention) x 3 (Power Level: Powerful vs. Powerless vs. 
Control) mixed ANOVA analyzed the number of promotion and prevention goals participants 
listed separately (as determined by their own ratings). Again, the main effect of power was 
significant (F(2, 139) = 3.22, p = .043) and a Tukey Test indicated that powerful participants 
listed significantly more goals (M = 12.26, SD = 3.96) than did powerless participants (M = 
10.48, SD = 3.28), but not more than the control participants did (M = 10.98, SD = 3.26). Again, 
the main effect of regulatory focus was significant (F(1, 139) = 281.20, p = .001), with 
participants rating many more goals as promotion goals (M = 8.78, SD = 3.37) than as prevention 
goals (M = 2.45, SD = 2.24). However, the interaction between power and regulatory focus was 
not significant (F(2, 139) = .01, p = .99). Again, these results did not support Hypothesis #1. 
3.6.4 Analysis 3: Hypothesis #2 
In order to test Hypothesis #2, an index was created from participants’ responses to the 
question on their goal information sheets about how likely they thought it was that they would 
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accomplish their goals. A one-way ANOVA examining the effects of power on this index was 
not significant (F(2, 139) = 2.22, p = .113). Participants in the powerful (M = 4.35, SD = .60), 
powerless (M = 4.61, SD = .51), and control (M = 4.50, SD = .61) conditions were equally 
confident about goal completion. A one-way ANOVA of an index composed only of responses 
to the question about goal accomplishment with regard to promotion goals (F(1, 139) = 1.42, p = 
.246) yielded similar results. A one-way ANOVA of an index composed only of responses to the 
question about goal pursuit with regard to prevention goals yielded a marginal effect of power 
(F(1, 139) = 2.66, p = .074); participants in the powerless (M = 4.67, SD = .61) and control (M = 
4.69, SD = .71) conditions both felt more confident about goal accomplishment than did 
participants in the powerful condition (M = 4.41, SD = .70). However, a Tukey Test indicated 
that these differences were not significant. Another index was created from participants’ 
responses on the goal information sheet about whether or not they were capable of 
accomplishing each goal. Once again, participants who felt powerful (M = 4.85, SD = .61) 
responded at a slightly lower level than did those in the control (M = 4.89, SD = .66) and 
powerless (M = 4.97, SD = .51) conditions. But a one-way ANOVA indicated that these 
differences were not significant (F(2, 139) = .56, p = .58). Additional one-way ANOVAs 
examining the effects of power specifically on the ability to accomplish promotion and 
prevention goals were also not significant (F(2, 139) = .95, p = .391 and F(1, 139) = .27, p = 
.762, respectively). Gender was significantly related to participants’ judgments of their ability to 
accomplish their promotion goals (r = .17, p = .04), however, including it as a covariate did not 
affect the analysis. These results failed to confirm Hypothesis #2. 
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3.6.5 Analysis 4: Hypothesis #2 
To further test Hypothesis #2, an index was created from participants’ responses to the 
question on their goal information sheet regarding how confident they felt about their responses 
to the question about the likelihood that they would accomplish each goal. Whereas the previous 
analysis focused on participants’ perceived valence (i.e., whether or not participants thought they 
would be successful in their goal pursuit), this question focused on participants’ perceived 
confidence in that response, which is another component of global confidence. Again, 
participants who felt powerful (M = 4.54, SD = .78) felt slightly less confident than did those in 
the powerless (M = 4.69, SD = .72) and control (M = 4.77, SD = .85) conditions, but these 
differences were not significant (F(2, 139) = 1.05, p = .351) when tested with a one-way 
ANOVA. Likewise, confidence in responses to questions that were specifically about either 
promotion or prevention goals did not vary significantly across conditions  (F(1, 139) = .50, p = 
.611 and F(1, 139) = 1.34, p = .264). Another index was created from participants’ responses to 
the question regarding how confident they felt about their response to the question about having 
the ability to accomplish each goal. Participants in the powerful condition were again slightly 
less confident (M = 4.83, SD = .68) than were those in the powerless (M = 4.87, SD = .68) and 
control (M = 5.00, SD = .81) conditions. But again, these differences were not significant, as 
tested by a one-way ANOVA (F(2, 139) = .77, p = .47). Similarly, ANOVAS specifically 
examining the effects of power on confidence in responses to questions about either promotion 
or prevention goals were not significant (F(2, 139) = .21, p = .81 and F(2, 139) = 1.55, p = .22, 
respectively). These results did not support Hypothesis #2. 
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3.6.6 Analysis 5: Hypothesis #2 
As a final test of Hypothesis #2, a unitary index was created to represent the outcome 
measures from Analysis 3 and Analysis 4. To create this unitary index, first an index was created 
from participants’ responses about how likely it was that they would accomplish their goals and 
whether or not they had the ability to accomplish their goals. Second, another index was created 
from participants’ responses about how confident they were about each of these questions. 
Finally, these indices were multiplied together to create a single score that represented both 
aspects of participants’ confidence about their responses -- whether or not they ultimately 
expected the goals to be completed and how confident they were about this response. Higher 
scores on this index reflected greater confidence that goals would be successfully completed. 
Following the trend observed in the previous two analyses, participants in the powerful condition 
scored slightly lower on this index (M = 21.70, SD = 4.82) than did participants in the powerless 
(M = 23.11, SD = 5.01) and control conditions (M = 23.28, SD = 6.14). However, these 
differences were not significant (F(2, 139) = 1.23, p = .295). Once again, ANOVAS specifically 
examining the effects of power on this index in responses to questions about either promotion or 
prevention goals were not significant (F(2, 139) = .73, p = .486 and F(2, 139) = 1.89, p = .154, 
respectively). Once again, the results did not support Hypothesis #2. 
3.6.7 Analysis 6: Hypothesis #3 
Because the predictor (power) was unrelated to the mediator (confidence) mediational 
analysis was not warranted. 
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3.6.8 Analysis 7: Related Emotions 
One-way ANOVAs examining the effects of power on participants’ responses to the 
questions about emotions that should be related to regulatory focus (anxious, F(2, 139) = .67, p = 
.511, happy, F(2, 139) = .75, p = .611, satisfied, F(2, 139) = .35, p = .709, and dejected, F(2, 
138) = .429, p = .652) did not yield any significant effects. 
3.7 DISCUSSION 
The results of Study 2 did not support the hypotheses. The manipulation check also 
failed. These problems probably arose from several methodological issues. For example, one 
manipulation check question asked how “able to do what you wanted” the participants felt in the 
situation they wrote about; and the anchor for the highest response on the scale (6) was 
“completely.” This anchor may have inadvertently restricted variance in the manipulation check 
scores. Although participants who wrote of a time they were powerful may have felt extremely 
able to do what they wanted in the situation they wrote about, “completely” was their highest 
response option. Participants who wrote about a time they went to the grocery store (for the 
control condition) may have also felt “completely” able to do what they wanted in that situation. 
Note that the powerful group did not differ from the control group on the manipulation check 
questions. To fix this problem, the manipulation check questions in Study 3 utilized responses 
and anchors designed to capture more variance. 
Another problem was that powerless and control participants were non-significantly more 
confident about their goal pursuit than powerful participants, though the difference approached 
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marginal significance (p = .113). This is puzzling given that past research has found that power 
increases confidence (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; See et al., 2011). One reason for this strange 
finding in the present research may be that, as expected, powerful individuals listed significantly 
more goals overall than did powerless and control participants (see analysis 2 in Study 2 above).  
This is consistent with previous research (Guinote, 2008, Study 1). If powerful people list more 
goals, then they may feel less confident about accomplishing each individual goal because their 
attention and resources would be divided in multiple ways. This is problematic because 
confidence was measured by asking each participant questions about each individual goal. 
Indeed, the number of goals participants listed was negatively correlated with participants’ own 
thoughts about both the likelihood of successful goal completion (r = -.34, p = .001) and their 
ability to accomplish each goal (r = -.29, p = .001). To rectify this situation, subsequent studies 
used methods for measuring confidence that should not be influenced by the number of goals 
participants listed.  
Finally, and contrary to predictions, powerful participants listed significantly (F(2, 139) = 
4.24, p = .016) more prevention goals (M = 6.02, SD = 2.23) than did both powerless (M = 5.15, 
SD = 2.01) and control (M = 4.85, SD = 1.82) participants. Post-hoc testing (Tukey Test) 
indicated that both the control and powerless conditions were different from the powerful 
condition, although the powerless condition was only marginally different. One explanation for 
this is that phrasing of the Galinsky essay prompt subtly elicited a prevention focus from 
participants by asking specifically about times they had power over others. Recent research 
(Lammers et al., 2009; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2011) has distinguished between two 
types of power; people with personal power can control their own outcomes and are 
unconstrained by others (e.g., the very wealthy), whereas those with social power can control 
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others’ outcomes (e.g., managers and teachers). Type of power may be an important variable in 
this context because social power may make people feel responsible for others and such feelings 
may increase prevention focus (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). Anecdotally, many participants 
wrote essays about situations in which they had social power (e.g., babysitting). It is possible that 
the mediational relationship I sought is stronger (or exists only) in cases of personal power. 
Perhaps social power increases both prevention focus and promotion focus, whereas personal 
power increases only promotion focus. So, in order to isolate personal power from social power 
and create a purer context in which to test for mediation, the Galinsky power manipulation was 
slightly altered in subsequent studies. 
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4.0  STUDY 3 
4.1 DESIGN 
This experiment followed a 3-way (Power Level: Powerful vs. Control vs. Powerless) 
between-subjects design. 
4.2 PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and seven students taking Introduction to Psychology participated in this 
study in exchange for course credit. Forty six students were male and 61 were female. Gender 
made no difference in the analyses, except where noted. 
4.3 POWER MANIPULATION 
Power was again manipulated by having participants recall a time they felt powerful or 
powerless, or (as a control condition) their latest trip to the grocery store (see Galinsky et al., 
2003). However, I used an adaptation of the prompt created by Lammers et al. (2009) to attempt 
to isolate personal power. In the powerful condition, participants were asked to “Please recall a 
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particular incident in which you personally had power, where you were independent from the 
influence of others. This means that you could fully determine what you yourself would do or get. 
Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how you felt, etc.” In 
the powerless condition, participants were asked to “Please recall a particular incident in which 
you personally lacked power, where you were dependent on someone or something else. This 
means that you could not determine at all what you yourself would do or get. Please describe 
this situation in which you did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.” Following 
each prompt, participants were provided with space to record their memories. 
4.4 MANIPULATION CHECK 
After that, participants filled out a questionnaire assessing how powerful (powerless) they 
felt in the situation described by their essay. Specifically, they reported how “in control,” 
“powerful,” “weak,” “influential” and “strong” they felt in that situation. All ratings were made 
on a -6 to +6 bipolar scale. The anchors for the “in control” question were “slightly more/less in 
control than I ordinarily feel,” “more/less in control than I ordinarily feel,” and “a great deal 
more/less in control than I ordinarily feel,” with “nor more nor any less in control than I 
ordinarily feel” as the midpoint anchor. All other manipulation check questions were formatted 
the same way. 
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4.5 REGULATORY FOCUS AND CONFIDENCE 
Participants generated three promotion goals and three prevention goals on two different 
goal list sheets. They then completed a goal information sheet for each goal (see Appendix H). 
Each goal information sheet asked them three questions, “How important is this goal to you,” 
“How interested in this goal are you,” and “How motivated are you to achieve this goal.” 
Responses were made on a 0 to 6 scale with “not at all,” “slightly,” “quite a bit,” and 
“extremely” as anchors. The mean of the ratings of these items across those three goals was the 
measure of promotion and prevention focus; stronger ratings for either type of goal indicated the 
corresponding focus. A similar measure was used by Roese, Hurr, and Penington (1999) to 
measure promotion and prevention focus. A final question on this goal information sheet 
measured confidence by asking “How confident are you that you will achieve this goal?” No 
order effects were expected. Nonetheless, these questions were counterbalanced using a 
Balanced Latin Square Design. Aside from the manipulation of power and the measures of 
regulatory focus and confidence, all other aspects of Study 3 were the same as those in Study 2. 
4.6 RESULTS 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3. As in both Study 2 and Cunningham et 
al.’s (2005) research, promotion and prevention scores were positively correlated (r = .23, p = 
..022). Confidence in goal achievement was also positively correlated to both promotion (r = .46,  
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Table 3: Study 3 Descriptive Statistics 
    
   M/SD    1    2  3  4 
1. Manipulation Check 
-.11
a
 /2.72  .84    
2. Promotion Focus 
 4.81/.77  -.03   .87   
3. Prevention Focus 
4.79/.78  -.06   .23* .84  
4. Confidence 
4.01/.78 -.01  .46** .45** .61 
Note. The Chronbach’s alpha for each scale is listed where rows and columns for each  
scale cross.  
a
The manipulation check response scale was bi-polar. The mean is slightly below the  
midpoint of the scale (0). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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p = .001) and prevention scores (r = .45, p =.001), perhaps because the question about 
confidence in goal accomplishment was asked in the same way as the questions measuring each 
regulatory focus. 
4.6.2 Analysis 1: Manipulation Check 
A scale created from the composite of the five manipulation check questions achieved 
adequate reliability (Chronbach’s Alpha = .87). Participants who wrote about a time they felt 
powerful (M = 2.72, SD = 1.36) reported feeling more powerful than did those in the control 
condition (M = .18, SD = 1.06), who in turn reported feeling more powerful than did those who 
wrote about a time they felt powerless (M = -2.89, SD = 1.69). A one-way ANOVA on this scale 
yielded a main effect of power (F(2, 101) = 141.49, p = .001). A Tukey Test indicated that both 
the powerful and the powerless conditions were significantly different from the control 
condition. 
4.6.3 Analysis 2: Hypothesis #1 
To create measures of regulatory focus, scales were created from participants’ responses 
to the three relevant questions on the goal information sheets. The score on participants’ 
prevention scale (Chronbach’s alpha = .84) was subsequently subtracted from the score on 
participants promotion scale (Chronbach’s alpha = .87) to create a regulatory focus index, where 
higher scores indicated greater promotion focus. Although powerful individuals had a slightly 
stronger promotion focus (M = .12, SD = 1.03) than did powerless individuals (M = -0.08, SD = 
1.01) and individuals in the control condition (M = -0.19, SD =.84), a one-way ANOVA on this 
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index was not significant (F(2, 101) = 1.03, p = .36). As in the previous studies, the results were 
further explored with a (2) (Regulatory Focus: Promotion vs. Prevention) x 3 (Power Level: 
Powerful vs. Powerless vs. Control) mixed ANOVA. Neither the main effect of regulatory focus 
(F(1, 101) = .003, p = .954), nor the main effect of power (F(2, 101) = 1.73, p = .182), nor the 
interaction between regulatory focus and power (F(2, 101) = 1.03, p = .361) was significant. 
Gender was significantly related to promotion focus (r = .20, p = .039), but including it as a 
covariate did not affect the results of this analysis. These results did not support Hypothesis #1. 
4.6.4 Analysis 3: Hypothesis #2 
In order to test Hypothesis #2, a one-way ANOVA was performed on participants’ 
responses to the question on the goal information sheets about their confidence in accomplishing 
each goal
6
. Participants who felt powerful were no more confident (M = 4.02, SD = .80) than 
participants who felt powerless (M = 4.01, SD = .71) or control participants (M = 3.98, SD = .86, 
F(2, 101) = .02, p = .985). This result did not support Hypothesis #2. 
4.6.5 Analysis 4: Hypothesis #3 
Again, the predictor (power) was unrelated to the mediator (confidence), so a mediational 
analysis was not warranted. 
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4.7 DISCUSSION 
Although the problems with the manipulation check were resolved in Study 3, the results 
were still disappointing. One explanation for the lack any relationship between power and 
confidence is that, although participants were asked to list only three goals, they may have 
generated more goals and simply not recorded them. If this is the case, then the problem of more 
goals equating to fewer resources for each goal and a depressed level of confidence about the 
attainment of each goal may not have been eliminated. So, in an effort to improve the 
measurement of confidence, I used a new measure in Study 4, one that focused on participants’ 
feelings of confidence about a topic that was not specifically related to the goals they listed. In 
this way, I hoped to tap more global feelings of confidence. For regulatory focus, I returned to 
the measure used in Study 1, a measure based on the number of promotion and prevention goals 
that participants listed. 
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5.0  STUDY 4 
5.1 DESIGN 
This experiment followed a 3-way (Power Level: Powerful vs. Control vs. Powerless) 
between-subjects design. 
5.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Ninety four students taking Introduction to Psychology participated in this study in 
exchange for course credit. Forty seven students were male and 47 were female. Gender made no 
difference in the analyses, except where noted. 
5.3 CONFIDENCE 
The procedure for measuring confidence was adapted from previous research (see Gino 
& Moore, 2006; See et al., 2011). Participants were asked to estimate the tuition for seven 
universities and colleges (see Appendix I). Following that, they were asked several questions to 
assess how confident they were about their estimates. Specifically, they were asked, “Overall, 
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how confident do you feel in your performance in the tuition estimation task” and “How accurate 
do you think you were in estimating the tuitions.” Ratings were made on a 0 to 6 scale, with “not 
at all” and “extremely” as anchors. Finally, they were asked, “Consider an estimate to be correct 
if it within $2000 of the actual tuition. Out of the 7 total tuitions, how many do you think you got 
correct?” (see appendix J). 
5.4 REGULATORY FOCUS 
The measurement of regulatory focus was the same as in Study 2 (i.e., the number of 
promotion and prevention goals that participants listed). However, no goal information sheets 
were used for this study, because of the alternate confidence measure. Aside from the measures 
of regulatory focus and confidence, all other aspects of Study 4 were the same as in Study 3. 
5.5 RESULTS 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4. As in Studies 2, 3, and Cunningham et al.’s 
(2005) research, promotion scores were significantly correlated with prevention scores (r = .33, p 
= .001). 
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Table 4: Study 4 Descriptive Statistics 
    
   M/SD    1    2  3  4 
1. Manipulation Check 
.39
a
 /3.02      
2. Promotion Focus 
 4.86/1.82  -.07      
3. Prevention Focus 
4.34/2.20  .03   .33**   
4. Confidence 
2.37/1.01 -.07  .09 .17  
a
The manipulation check response scale was bi-polar. The mean is slightly below the  
midpoint of the scale (0). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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5.5.2 Analysis 1: Manipulation Check 
A scale created from the composite of the five manipulation check questions achieved 
adequate reliability (Chronbach’s Alpha = .88). Participants who wrote about a time where they 
felt powerful (M = 3.25, SD = 1.66) reported feeling more powerful than did participants in the 
control condition (M = .69, SD = 1.62), who in turn reported feeling more powerful than did 
participants who wrote about a time where they felt powerless (M = -2.92, SD = 1.53). A one-
way ANOVA on this scale yielded a main effect of power (F(2, 91) = 118.24, p = .001). A 
Tukey Test indicated that both the powerful group and the powerless group were significantly 
different from the control condition. 
5.5.3 Analysis 2: Hypothesis #1 
As in Study 1, the number of prevention goals participants listed was subtracted from the 
number of promotion goals that participants listed to create a regulatory focus index, one in 
which higher scores indicate a stronger promotion focus. Powerful individuals (M = .64, SD = 
2.51), powerless individuals (M = .58, SD = 2.05), and individuals in the control condition (M = 
.33, SD = 2.54) all had similar levels of promotion focus, and so a one-way ANOVA on this 
index was not significant (F(2, 91) = .14, p = .868). Again, to further explore the data, a (2) 
(Regulatory Focus: Promotion vs. Prevention) x 3 (Power Level: Powerful vs. Control vs. 
Powerless) mixed ANOVA yielded only a main effect of regulatory focus (F(1, 91) = 4.44, p = 
.038). Participants listed more promotion goals (M = 4.86, SD = 1.82) than prevention goals (M = 
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4.34, SD = 2.20). However, gender was significantly related to the number of promotion goals 
participants listed (r = .28, p = .007) and including it as a covariate eliminated the main effect of 
regulatory focus. Neither the main effect of power nor the interaction between power and 
regulatory focus achieved significance (F(2, 91) = 1.20, p = .307 and F(2, 91) = .14, p = .868). 
Again, these results did not support Hypothesis #1. 
5.5.4 Analysis 3: Hypothesis #2 
To test Hypothesis #2, the three questions regarding participants’ confidence in their 
estimates of college tuitions were combined into a scale. This scale achieved good reliability 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .83). Participants who felt powerful (M = 2.32, SD = 1.02), participants 
who felt powerless (M = 2.46, SD = .89), and participants in the control condition (M = 2.33, SD 
= 1.14) all had similar levels of confidence. The differences were not statistically significant 
(F(1, 91) = .17, p = .841). This result did not support Hypothesis #2. 
5.5.5 Analysis 4: Hypothesis #3 
Again, the predictor (power) was unrelated to the mediator (confidence), and so 
mediational analysis was not warranted. 
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5.6 DISCUSSION 
 Again, the results of Study 4 were disappointing. In light of this, I returned to 
examining relationships at the dispositional level. One benefit of testing for the relationship 
between power and regulatory focus using a scale is that this makes it easier to ask specific 
questions that should tap into feelings of personal power. It is possible that, even with the 
alterations, the Galinsky power manipulation prompt is simply not suited for priming participants 
to feel “personally” powerful. Directing them to write about a time they felt powerful may make 
salient to them times when they felt both personal and social power, because in reality both types 
of power are often experienced together. Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) General Power Scale 
uses questions that are quite specific and relate more directly to “personal” power (e.g., “If I 
want to, I get to make the decisions” and “Even when I voice them, my views have little sway”). 
This scale should target dispositional feelings of personal power. To measure expectations about 
success, I used the Life Orientation Test – Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). I did not 
use the RFS to measure regulatory focus in Study 5, because it was not significantly related to 
the regulatory focus index in Study 1. Instead, I replaced it with another commonly used 
regulatory focus measure, the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 
2002). 
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6.0  STUDY 5 
6.1 DESIGN 
This study followed a correlational design. 
6.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Ninety-five students taking Introduction to Psychology participated in this study in 
exchange for a piece of candy. Twenty-five students were male and 68 were female (two 
participants chose not to report their gender). Three participants provided data that were in some 
way incomplete. However, omitting these participants did not alter the results in a significant 
way. So, they were included in the following analyses. Gender made no difference in the 
analyses except where noted. 
6.3 MEASURES AND PROCEDURE 
Participants again completed the General Power Scale (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). In 
order to measure participants’ beliefs about their general ability to accomplish their goals, they 
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were given a commonly used optimism measure, the Life Orientation Test - Revised (Scheier et 
al., 1994). On this measure, participants responded to statements such as “I hardly ever expect 
things to go my way” (reverse coded) on a -4 to 4 bipolar scale with “Strongly disagree” and 
“Strongly agree” as the anchors for the endpoints and “Neutral” as the anchor for the midpoint. 
This scale contains 10 items, three of which are reverse coded. Participants’ responses to the 
items on this scale were summed and then divided by 10 to obtain their Life Orientation Test – 
Revised scores. As in the previous study, regulatory focus was measured in two ways. First, the 
PVQ (Schwartz, 2003) was used. The second regulatory focus measure was the Regulatory 
Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) (Lockwood et al., 2002). When taking the RFQ, participants 
responded to statements such as “In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my 
life” on a 0 to 8 scale with “Not at all true of me” and “Extremely true of me” as anchors for the 
end points. The anchor for the midpoint of the scale was “True of me.” Like the PVQ, this 18-
item scale is composed of two subscales, one measuring promotion focus (with nine items) and 
another measuring prevention focus (with nine items). Participants’ scores on the promotion 
subscale items were summed and divided by nine to obtain their promotion scores. The same 
procedure was used with their scores on the prevention subscale items to obtain their prevention 
scores. The order of all the scales was counterblananced. Additionally, participants were asked to 
provide some demographic information, such as their age and gender. 
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6.4 RESULTS 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
See Table 5 for descriptive statistics. All scales achieved adequate reliability 
(Chronbach’s alphas greater than .70). The promotion RFQ correlated significantly with the 
promotion PVQ (r = .35, p = .001) and the prevention RFQ correlated significantly with the 
prevention PVQ (r = .27, p = .009). This demonstrates good criterion validity for these scales. 
6.4.2 Analysis 1: Hypothesis #1 
In order to create a regulatory focus index, participants’ scores on the prevention RFQ 
subscale were subtracted from their scores on the promotion RFQ subscale. Higher scores on this 
index indicate a stronger promotion focus. The correlation between the General Power Scale and 
this regulatory focus index was examined to test Hypothesis #1. The General Power Scale 
significantly predicted RFQ scores (r = .30, p = .004). However, the General power scale was 
only associated with a net gain in promotion focus; general power was not significantly related to 
the promotion subscale of the RFQ (r = .08, p = .431). Instead, it was inversely related to the 
prevention subscale of the RFQ (r = -.24, p = .023). 
Another regulatory focus index was created by subtracting participants’ scores on the 
prevention PVQ subscale from their promotion PVQ subscale scores. Again, to test Hypothesis 
#1, the correlation between the General Power Scale and this regulatory focus index was 
examined. Although general power was positively related to this index, the relationship was not 
significant (r = .15, p = .152). General power was marginally positively related to the promotion  
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Table 5: Study 5 Descriptive Statistics 
      
   M/SD    1    2  3  4  5 6 
1. General Power 
5.10/.96  .88      
2. LOT-R 
 .94
a
/1.66  .46**   .85     
3. Promotion RFQ 
5.97/1.26  .08   .23* .87    
4. Prevention RFQ 
4.21/1.49 -.24*  -.36** .39** .81   
5. Promotion PVQ 
3.96/1.01  .20   .18 .36** .15  .79  
6. Prevention PVQ 
3.33/.91 -.03   .16 .34** .27** -.05 .81 
Note. The Chronbach’s alpha for each scale is listed where rows and columns for each scale cross.  
a
The LOT-R response scale was bi-polar. The mean is slightly above the midpoint of the scale (0). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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PVQ subscale (r = .20, p = .059) and this relationship became significant (β = .22, p = .035) 
when controlling for the effects of gender. Power was negatively related to the prevention PVQ 
subscale (r = -.02, p = .84), though the relationship was not significant. Overall, these results 
partially supported Hypothesis #1. 
6.4.3 Analysis 2: Hypothesis #2 
To test Hypothesis #2, the correlation between the General Power Scale and the LOT-R 
was examined. That correlation was significant (r = .46, p = .001), which supported Hypothesis 
#2. 
6.4.4 Analysis 3: Hypothesis #3 
Because the General Power Scale was positively related to the LOT-R (the proposed 
mediator) mediational analysis was warranted. A Sobel test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), indicated 
that the LOT-R was a significant mediator of the relationship between the General Power Scale 
and the RFQ regulatory focus index (z = 3.53, p = .001)
7
. Figure 2 illustrates this mediation.  
However, these results only held for the RFQ regulatory focus index; a Sobel test using the PVQ 
regulatory focus index was not significant. 
Again, mediational analysis was carried out on the components of the regulatory focus 
indices to further explore these effects. A Sobel test indicated that the LOT-R was a significant 
mediator of the relationship between the General Power Scale and the RFQ prevention scale (z = 
-2.42, p = .015)
8
. The LOT-R was also a marginally significant mediator of the relationship 
between the General Power Scale and the PVQ prevention scale (z = 1.73, p=.0839). The LOT-R 
 58 
 
Figure 2: Mediational analysis from Study 5. Standardized beta values for the unmediated and 
mediated relationships between the General Power Scale and the RFQ Regulatory Focus Index in Study 5. * 
p < .05, ** p < .01 
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also marginally significantly mediated the relationship between the General Power Scale and the 
RFQ Promotion scale (z = 1.94, p = .053). A Sobel test also indicated that the LOT-R did not 
mediate the relationship between the General Power scale and the PVQ Promotion scale (z = .90, 
p = .3687).  These results partially supported Hypothesis #3. 
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7.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Ultimately, the results of these studies provided partial support for the mediating role of 
positive outcome expectancies in the relationship between power and regulatory focus. Evidence 
for these relationships was obtained when using dispositional measures of power, outcome 
expectancies, and regulatory focus. However, when power was manipulated, no evidence was 
obtained for outcome expectancies as a mediator, or for the relationship between power and 
regulatory focus. This is an odd finding, given that previous literature has independently 
documented each of these effects of manipulated power (e.g., See et al., 2011; Willis, 2009). 
However, there are several reasons that the present research may not have found similar results. 
7.1 MANIPULATED POWER AND REGULATORY FOCUS 
Despite the copious evidence for the relationship between regulatory focus and power, 
that relationship may a) be weak, b) exist only in the case of dispositional power, or c) be weak 
and exist only in the case of dispositional power. Dispositional power and one of the regulatory 
focus indices were related to each other in both Studies 1 and 5. However, the amount of 
variance explained in each case was rather small (R
2
 = .03 and R
2
 = .09, respectively). Also, in 
both Studies 1 and 5, only one measure of regulatory focus was significantly related to power, 
and the PVQ index was related in Study 1, but not in Study 5. This further suggests that the 
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relationship between power and regulatory focus is weak. The situational measures of regulatory 
focus used in the second, third, and fourth studies may not have been sufficiently sensitive to 
capture the motivational differences created by participants’ altered feelings of power. 
Furthermore, despite the plentiful indirect evidence, little direct evidence has been obtained for 
the relationship between manipulated power and regulatory focus. Perhaps this relationship only 
exists for power and regulatory focus when they are measured as personality traits, because only 
life-long feelings of power are pervasive, rigid, and robust enough to influence an individual’s 
regulatory focus. Much research finds similar effects for both dispositional and situational power 
(e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), but some does find more complex relationships between 
these variables (e.g., Chen et al., 2009). It is possible that unreported investigations have 
manipulated power and sought this relationship, but found non-significant results, and that the 
few existing significant results (see Willis, 2009; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010) represent 
Type 1 errors (i.e., the file drawer problem). Alternately, this relationship may only exist when 
dispositional and situational power match each other. Unfortunately, power was never 
manipulated and measured at the same time in this research, so the effects of dispositional power 
could not be controlled. However, there are other reasons that the previous research on this topic 
may not be directly comparable to the current investigation. 
Much of the foundational research for this project was conducted in populations that 
speak a different language than the population I studied. Both Willis (2009) and Willis and 
Rodríguez-Bailón (2010) conducted their studies at the University of Grenada, where students 
are likely to speak Spanish. Also, in Study 1, the RFS index (Fellner et al., 2007) was not 
significantly related to the General Power Scale (though the prevention subscale was related to 
power). As previously mentioned, this scale was developed for use at the University of Vienna, 
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where the population is primarily German-speaking. Of course, an English translation was used 
for the primarily English speaking population in the present research. Differences between the 
results of this research and previous research may reflect linguistic differences in the samples. 
The items on the RFS may not tap regulatory focus in English-speaking individuals due to 
linguistic connotations in the language of origin that are not replicated in the English translation. 
Furthermore, cultural differences in regulatory focus have been found in the past (e.g., Lee et al., 
2000; Uskul, Sherman, & Fitzgibbon, 2009). For example, parents in some European countries 
place particular emphasis on their children’s obligations (Grossman, Grossmann, Huber, & 
Wartner, 1981). This could affect regulatory focus and its relationship with other variables, 
particularly because dispositional regulatory focus is thought to develop, in part, from parent-
child interactions (Higgins, 1989). Perhaps the relationship between manipulated power and 
regulatory focus exists in some cultures but not in others. Alternately, this relationship may vary 
in strength by culture. 
Finally, the attempts at disentangling social and personal power made in the third and 
fourth studies (i.e., the alterations to the Galinsky power manipulation) may have been 
unsuccessful. Perhaps their entanglement obfuscated the relationship between power and 
regulatory focus. Social and personal power are separate concepts with different outcomes (see 
Lammers et al., 2009; Sassenberg et al., 2011). However, the revised essay prompt developed for 
this project may have evoked thoughts of social power in individuals, despite its lack of explicit 
reference to power over others. As mentioned before, thoughts about others may evoke a 
prevention focus (Lee et al., 2000), so thoughts about having power over others may also evoke a 
prevention focus. The more focused and specific questions on Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) 
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generalized power scale, which was related to regulatory focus in Studies 1 and 5, may have 
avoided this problem. 
7.2 MANIPULATED POWER AND SUCCESS EXPECTANCIES 
The lack of relationship between manipulated power and success expectancies was also 
perplexing, given that a positive relationship would have replicated previous findings (Anderson 
& Galinsky, 2006; See et al., 2011). Especially vexing is that See and colleagues used a task to 
measure expectations of success that is quite similar to the task that I used in Study 4. One 
methodological difference between the current research and See et al. is the time lapse between 
the power manipulation and the measurement of expectations about success. In See et al.’s 
research, the transition from the power manipulation to the measurement of success expectancies 
was instantaneous. In my Studies 2, 3, and 4, great pains were taken to move participants quickly 
through the experimental tasks, but the “two study paradigm” that was used to uphold the cover 
story prevented participants from transitioning instantly into the success expectancy measure 
after writing the power essay. Thus, participants’ feelings of power may have decayed by the 
time they did the confidence task. An effect of power on outcome expectancies might have been 
found with a shorter time lapse between manipulation and measurement. 
Alternately, it is possible that manipulating power does not actually increase expectations 
of success. Perhaps artificially elevating an individual’s feelings of power makes that power 
seem illegitimate. This may elicit feelings of immunity that resemble confidence, depending on 
the situation and questions asked (see Lammers et al. (2008), Smith, Jost, et al. (2008), and 
Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón (2010) for more effects on the of illegitimate power). If this is the 
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case, then people made to feel powerful may not be confident, but simply care less about failure. 
This would be consistent with the proclivity for risk-taking displayed by powerful individuals 
(see Anderson & Galinsky, 2003). The finding from Study 5, that people who felt dispositionally 
powerful scored higher on the LOT-R, may seem to contradict this reasoning. However, 
measuring these variables dispositionally (instead of artificially manipulating them) may avoid 
these illegitimacy problems. Natural feelings of power probably seem legitimate to the 
individuals who have them. Alternately, the effects of feeling powerful throughout one’s life 
may be qualitatively (not quantitatively) different than the effects of feeling powerful over the 
course of a few minutes. Again, power’s relationships with some variables, such as confidence, 
may vary depending on whether power is situational or dispositional or the match between 
situational and dispositional power. 
7.3 DISPOSITIONAL POWER AND REGULATORY FOCUS 
 In support of Hypothesis #1, Studies 1 and 5 did find evidence for the relationship 
between power and regulatory focus when measuring dispositional tendencies. Although 
previous investigations have found a relationship between manipulated power and regulatory 
focus, this is the first test of this relationship in dispositional format. Of note is that the results 
were much stronger for the RFQ regulatory focus index than for the PVQ regulatory focus index. 
In fact, power was unrelated to the PVQ regulatory focus index in both Study 1 (when including 
gender as a covariate) and Study 5. The relationships between general power and the component 
scales of the PVQ index were more encouraging; in Studies 1 and 5, power was positively 
related to the PVQ promotion scale and unrelated to the PVQ prevention scale. But this pattern 
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of correlations was opposite to the pattern found with the component scales of the RFQ index; 
power was unrelated to the promotion RFQ scale but negatively related to the prevention RFQ 
scale. The relationships between power and the component RFQ scales are inconsistent with the 
prediction that power should specifically increase promotion focus. The different pattern of 
relationships that power has with the components of each index were also odd, given the strong 
positive correlations between the promotion PVQ and RFQ scales and between the prevention 
PVQ and RFQ scales in Study 5. However, the regulatory focus indices created by subtracting 
prevention scores from promotion scores in each case were not significantly correlated (r = .09, p 
= .402). Why might this discrepancy exist? 
This may be due to the specific aspect of regulatory focus that is tapped by the RFQ. That 
scale conceptualizes promotion focus specifically as motivation to attain gains and prevention 
focus specifically as motivation to avoid losses, as opposed to conceptualizing promotion focus 
as a drive to achieve personal, internal standards and prevention focus as a drive to achieve 
external standards instilled by society (Summerville & Roese, 2008). Both conceptualizations 
focus on different aspects of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). The PVQ seems to reflect the 
latter component of regulatory focus. The procedure of subtracting one component scale from 
another may exaggerate this difference (hence the correlations among the component scales, but 
not between the indices). The fact that power seems to be more strongly related to one index than 
to the other suggests that power may be related to these different aspects of regulatory focus in 
different ways. Power may be associated with an increased reliance on internal standards for goal 
setting (one specific aspect of promotion focus that may be measured by the PVQ) and also a 
decrease in motivation to avoid losses (one specific aspect of prevention focus measured by the 
RFQ). Indeed, different relationships between power and these different aspects of regulatory 
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focus may account for the tendency for the global relationship between power and regulatory 
focus to manifest itself weakly; any particular regulatory focus measure may be more or less 
sensitive to changes in only one aspect of regulatory focus. More research is needed on this topic 
before firm conclusions can be drawn about the specific aspects of regulatory focus that power 
affects. However, that research would be relevant to the finding that power increases risk taking 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and may help clarify whether powerful people make riskier 
decisions due to a true increase in preference for risk or a weakened preference for caution. 
7.4 THE MEDIATING ROLE OF SUCCESS EXPECTANCIES 
Study 5 uncovered a positive relationship between power and the expectation of success 
and also evidence for the mediating role of the expectation of success in the relationship between 
power and regulatory focus. This supported Hypotheses #2 and #3. However, expectations of 
success were only significantly related to the RFQ index (not the PVQ index). Consequently, 
mediation occurred only for the relationship between power and the RFQ index. As mentioned 
earlier, this may be a result of the different aspect of regulatory focus measured by the RFQ 
(Summerville & Roese, 2008). The increase in expectations of success related to dispositional 
power may only act upon the particular aspects of regulatory focus measured by the RFQ (i.e., 
the motivation to attain gains and avoid losses). If so, then that may explain why the relationship 
between dispositional power and regulatory focus was weaker when measuring regulatory focus 
with the PVQ; the mediating mechanism may not have acted upon the aspects of regulatory 
focus measured by the PVQ. Again, more research is needed on the relationship between 
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expectations of success and the specific aspects of regulatory focus that are measured by these 
different scales. 
7.5 POWER AND PREVENTION 
Further complicating the findings of Study 5 was the fact that the positive relationship 
between power and promotion (as measured by the RFQ index, which was created by subtracting 
prevention scores from promotion scores) appeared to only be a net gain in promotion. An 
examination of the correlations between dispositional power and the RFQ promotion also 
between the dispositional power and RFQ prevention scales revealed that the gain in promotion 
focus (as measured by the RFQ index) was driven by a reduction in prevention focus rather than 
by an increase in promotion focus. This contradicts previous research (Willis, 2009). These 
findings imply that power-associated changes in global regulatory focus may be due specifically 
to changes in prevention focus. This, along with the negative relationship between power and 
expectations of success, makes it appear that powerless individuals are placed in a motivation-
increasing state of prevention failure. But research does not indicate an increase in motivation 
for powerless people (e.g., Willis et al., 2010). How can these results be reconciled with the 
claim that powerful individuals should be in a motivation-increasing state of promotion success, 
whereas motivation should not increase for the powerless? 
The results from Studies 2 and 4 indicate that promotion seems to be the more prevalent 
of the two regulatory foci (see also Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes 1994). Additionally, only 
10 individuals in Study 5 had a negative RFQ index score (i.e., a stronger predominant 
prevention focus). Given that, and the results of Study 5, consider what happens from a global 
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regulatory focus perspective as power increases: prevention focus decreases and this exaggerates 
the natural inclination towards promotion and allows a more clear expression of that focus. Thus, 
the co-occurring expectations of success intensify motivation, resulting in a state of promotion 
success. Now consider what happens from a global regulatory focus perspective as power 
decreases: prevention focus increases, but given individuals’ natural inclination towards 
promotion, levels of promotion and prevention merely become more equal. This means that 
powerless individuals lack a predominant regulatory focus (i.e., their levels of promotion and 
prevention in global regulatory focus are more equal). The increase in prevention just serves to 
muddy the motivational waters. This also means that the decrease in expectations of success that 
powerless people experience may not result in a motivation-enhancing state of prevention 
failure; there is no clearly expressed focus for expectations of success to act upon. Such an 
explanation is consistent with the motivational differences observed between powerful and 
powerless individuals. However, these results were found with only one regulatory focus index. 
Power seemed to have less impact on the PVQ prevention scale, and more impact on the PVQ 
promotion scale. So, again, the specific aspects of regulatory focus measured by these scales may 
play a role in these findings. 
Research showing that success expectancies affect motivation through global (i.e., 
predominant) regulatory focus, rather than through individual regulatory foci (i.e., promotion or 
prevention), would lend credence to the above explanation. This research did not specifically 
address the question of which is more important for motivation, global or specific regulatory 
focus. However, an inference can be made using these results and the results of previous 
research. Contrary to predictions, in Study 5 expectations of success were negatively related to 
the RFQ prevention scale and also mediated the negative relationship between the RFQ 
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prevention scale and power. If expectations of success were to affect specific (not global) 
regulatory focus, then this result would imply that powerless individuals enjoy the motivational 
boost associated with prevention failure. However, much previous research on this topic has 
failed to identify any motivational boost among the powerless; such a boost is usually found only 
among the powerful (e.g., Willis et al., 2010). Taken together, previous research and the results 
of Study 5 suggest that success expectancies affect motivation through global (not specific) 
regulatory focus. Such a state of affairs would explain how the results of Study 5 can co-exist 
with previous research. Although this reasoning suggests that global regulatory focus is more 
important, research directly addressing this question will again be needed before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
7.6 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
This research has some distinct strengths. Over the course of the five studies, power was 
operationalized three different ways, regulatory focus was operationalized five different ways, 
and the expectation of success was operationalized eight different ways. This variety of 
operationizations yielded information about the generality of the relationships under 
investigation. For example, significant relationships were obtained only when measuring 
variables dispositionally. This indicates an important boundary condition of the findings. 
An issue related to the different operationalizations of power is the use of power 
manipulations designed to target specific types of power (i.e., personal vs. social power). This 
typology of power has not received the attention that it deserves in the literature. The distinction 
between these different types of power seems important, particularly for research concerning the 
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relationship between power and regulatory focus. This research contributes to the small 
subsection of the power literature that has begun to examine and compare the effects of these 
different types of power. 
Additionally, little research has examined the reasons for the greater motivation of 
powerful individuals (but see Guinote, 2010). Rather than simply accepting this greater 
motivation as canonical, my research took a step towards the development of an explanatory 
framework and suggested ways to control and increase that motivation. This fills a gap in the 
literature on power and implies useful analyses of situations where hierarchical relationships are 
common, such as in the military or the corporate world. Understanding the type of motivation 
that powerful individuals have and where this motivation comes from can help to predict and 
control the behavior of those individuals. This understanding also can help organizational 
planners to comprehend and improve the motivation of powerless individuals, who are often 
ignored by researchers. 
As has often been done in previous research on regulatory focus (e.g., Idson et al., 2000), 
I measured regulatory focus as a unitary difference score. Difference scores used as dependent 
measures have some inherent weaknesses; they have lower reliability than their component 
scores, obfuscate the variance added by component scores, and can yield misleading results 
(Edwards, 1995). Nonetheless, they are a convenient means of representing the direction of an 
individual’s motivational tendencies. In light of these issues, this research examined the 
component scales (i.e., prevention and promotion) of each difference score, in addition to the 
difference score itself. These extra analyses painted a clearer picture of the different 
contributions that power made to both prevention and promotion focus, instead of conflating its 
unique effects on these two independent constructs
9
. 
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However, this research also had some weaknesses. One explanation for the disappointing 
results of Studies 2, 3, and 4 is that the power manipulation did not effectively manipulate 
participants’ feelings of power. Although the Galinsky power manipulation has often been used 
successfully to manipulate power in the past, and despite the successful manipulation check in 
Studies 3 and 4, powerful participants did not report feeling tremendously powerful in an 
absolute sense (M = 2.72 and M = 3.25 on a bipolar scale, where the highest response was 6 and 
the lowest was -6 for Studies 3 and 4, respectively). It is possible that this manipulation was 
simply not strong or meaningful enough to elicit changes in a variable as pervasive as type of 
motivation. Stronger effects might be found if participants were placed in simulated power-
asymmetrical relationships (i.e., made to be either a manager or a subordinate in a dyad). Such a 
situation might be more psychologically meaningful to participants and could thus elicit stronger 
effects on motivation. 
Another problem in my research was the low Chronbach’s alphas obtained for several 
regulatory focus measures in Study 1. As mentioned previously, some of these measures were 
originally designed for use in non-American samples. This may explain these low reliabilities. 
Regulatory focus is a difficult variable to define with scalar measures (see Summerville & 
Roese, 2008 for a discussion of some of these problems) and these difficulties may have 
contributed to both the low Chronbach’s alphas and also to the weak and sometimes non-
converging results that I obtained. Future researchers should develop scales that better assess 
regulatory focus and then replicate my own and other research with these new measures. 
Additionally, the correlational design used in Studies 1 and 5 to test for these 
relationships did not reveal the direction of causation or the elimination of third variables that 
could be driving the relationships. Indeed, the constellation of results from these studies is 
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consistent with causation moving in the reverse direction from that which I hypothesized. It is 
possible that increased promotion focus led to increased expectations of success (see Gino & 
Margolis, 2011; Haslett, Molden, & Sackett, 2011) and, eventually, to increased feelings of 
power. The many common outcomes of power and regulatory focus suggest this is a possibility. 
Likewise, it is possible that individuals who expect to be successful are also more likely to feel 
powerful and have a promotion focus. A related problem is that the concurrent measurement of 
these variables makes it impossible to demonstrate that the change in the mediator preceded a 
change in the dependent variable. Unfortunately, these questions cannot be fully addressed until 
more experimental work is completed. 
Finally, one criticism that is often levied against power research is that students in an 
experimental situation may inherently feel powerless. For example, consider that students in a 
research participation pool a) typically feel that participating in psychology experiments is not 
worthwhile, b) are repeatedly informed that their participation is voluntary and that they can 
leave whenever they want without loss of credit, and c) almost never get up and walk out.  
Collectively, these three facts could indicate that participants were either afraid to leave or felt 
that they lacked the authority to make that decision. Indeed, Study 5, one of the two studies in 
which the proposed relationships were uncovered, did not make use of the University of 
Pittsburgh’s participant pool. In this study, students in psychology classes received a small piece 
of candy, not course credit, for their participation. It is unlikely that students in Study 5 felt 
compelled to participate or unable to exit. This could explain the more positive results of this 
study; perhaps those participants felt more comfortable and in control. Though it is possible that 
participating in research makes students feel weak and helpless, it stands to reason that 
differences in motivation should still be observed if power, expectations of success, and 
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regulatory focus are, in fact, related. Furthermore, much research on power makes use of 
students participating for course credit and does find significant effects. Nonetheless, when 
interpreting the results of this or any research, it is important to consider the context in which the 
data were collected and the way that context could have affected the relationships under 
investigation. 
7.7 IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The implications of this research are far-reaching. First, this investigation provided a 
fuller picture of the relationship between power and regulatory focus, and indeed power and 
motivation more generally. Previous research has hypothesized and found a relationship between 
power and regulatory focus, but little attention has been given to the reasons for that relationship. 
Identifying the causal mechanisms behind relationships is an important step in theory building 
and making causal inferences. Furthermore, one of the most pervasive findings in the flurry of 
recent research on power is the increased goal persistence of powerful individuals. Like the more 
specific body of research just mentioned, much of the research on power and general motivation 
is atheoretical, in that little attention has been given to the mechanisms through which this 
increased motivation occurs. This research helps to fill these gaps by investigating a mechanism, 
increased expectations of success, through which the increase in promotion focus takes place. 
The previously mentioned lack of theoretical explanations for the motivational 
differences between the powerful and powerless does have one notable exception. Guinote 
(2010) attributed this difference to cognitive deficits in powerless individuals (e.g., Smith et al., 
2008). Interestingly, my research converges with Guinote’s analysis. As previously mentioned, 
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regulatory fit is a state where regulatory focus and means of goal pursuit map onto each other 
(Higgins, 2000). For example, someone with a promotion focus who eagerly pursues rewards 
(instead of vigilantly avoiding threats) would be in a state of regulatory fit. This state enhances 
both cognitive processing and motivation (Evans & Petty, 2003; Foster et al., 1998; Higgins, 
2000; Lee & Aaker, 2004). If powerlessness makes levels of prevention focus and promotion 
focus more equivalent, then it should be difficult for powerless individuals to pick means of goal 
pursuit that match their global regulatory focus. Having more equivalent promotion and 
prevention foci should make regulatory fit more difficult to attain. This may be the source of the 
cognitive and motivational deficits mentioned by Guinote. 
Additionally, some of my research showed a mediational role for expectations of success, 
I only examined the direction of motivation (i.e., promotion or prevention focus), and not its 
intensity (i.e., persistence in goal pursuit). Future research should determine if expectations of 
success mediate the relationship between power and increased persistence in goal pursuit in the 
same way that they mediate the relationship between power and promotion focus. The current 
analysis suggests that this would be the case, due to powerful individuals being in a state of 
promotion success and the intense emotions that come along with it. 
In my research, a mediational role for expectations of success was found when power, 
success expectations, and regulatory focus were measured, but not when those variables were 
manipulated. Most research finds similar effects of power whether it is measured or manipulated 
(e.g., Cote et al., 2011), but some research does find that measured power moderates the effects 
of manipulated power (e.g., Chen et al., 2009). Future research should both manipulate and 
measure power in the same participants in the hopes of determining whether these types of 
power both affect motivation in the same way (and perhaps strengthen each other’s influence) or 
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have different effects on motivation. The applications of such research are far reaching; in 
hierarchical organizations, individuals could be given positions that best map onto their 
dispositions.  
Future research should also consider situations that evoke feelings of power of varying 
pervasiveness. For example, babysitting your neighbor’s children for one night may make you 
feel somewhat powerful for brief time, but spending 25 years as the CEO of a Fortune 500 
company would make you feel much more powerful for a much longer time. The latter situation 
probably has a more profound impact on motivation. Information about temporary (vs. 
permanent) situational power would also be useful to organizational planners. 
Additionally, future research should examine the different aspects of regulatory focus 
(measured by the RFQ and PVQ) and how they are related to the variables in my research. I 
found that these different aspects were quite important; mediational results were different 
depending on whether the RFQ or the PVQ was used. Our understanding of these motivational 
tendencies can be increased by paying greater attention to the way that slightly different 
operationalizations tap specific aspects of global regulatory focus. In light of this, replicating 
previously obtained results with new measures of regulatory focus may provide valuable insight 
into the true nature of that construct. 
Another issue that deserves deeper inquiry is the distinction between personal and social 
power. Since French and Raven’s (1959) research, little attention has been given to different 
types of power and most modern research on power considers it to be a unitary concept (see 
Guinote, 2010; Keltner et al., 2003). However, in recent years the difference between personal 
and social power has started to receive more attention (see Lammers et al., 2009; Sassenberg et 
al., 2011). It is possible that personal power (being unconstrained) has the strongest effect on 
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promotion focus whereas social power (being in charge of others) has the strongest effect on 
prevention focus. Unfortunately, these types of power often co-occur, which makes disentangling 
their unique effects difficult. Nonetheless, previous research has examined them separately and 
future research should continue to document both their separate and combined effects on 
motivation. In particular, developing manipulations that access these different types of power 
would be helpful in isolating their unique effects. 
On a more practical level, my research suggests a way to increase motivation. If success 
expectancies do mediate the relationship between power and regulatory focus, then altering 
success expectancies (even more than power) would increase motivation. In other words, making 
powerful people expect more success should lead them to pursue their goals even more fervently. 
Utilizing success expectancies in this way can help us better predict and control the motivation 
of individuals in power hierarchies. Future research, perhaps in real world settings, should 
attempt to manipulate feelings of confidence to see if these predictions are born out. 
Furthermore, the results of Study 5 indicate that power specifically reduces the 
motivation to avoid losses while leaving the motivation to attain gains intact. This may offer 
some insight into the lapses of judgment sometimes displayed by powerful individuals (e.g., 
Bernie Madoff, the Penn State scandal). Much research has also examined the potential for 
powerful individuals to act and think in unbecoming ways (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000; 
Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012; Kipnis, 1972; Richeson & Ambady, 2003). My research 
indicates that this may be due, in part, to a tendency for the powerful to ignore potential negative 
consequences of their actions. Perhaps by reminding powerful individuals of these consequences, 
some of the pernicious effects of power can be eliminated. However, one goal of such research 
should be to preserve power’s many beneficial effects (Galinsky, Magee, et al., 2008; Gruenfeld 
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et al., 2008; Rodin & Langer, 1977). Instead of simply eliminating feelings of power, tempering 
them with reminders of consequences may prevent us from throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. 
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8.0  APPENDIX A 
Please use the following scale to rate the items below: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Disagree a 
little 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree a little Agree Agree 
strongly 
 
In my relationships with others… 
_____I can get people to listen to what I say. 
_____My wishes do not carry much weight. 
_____I can get others to do what I want. 
_____Even if I voice them, my views have little sway. 
_____I think I have a great deal of power. 
_____My ideas and opinions are often ignored. 
_____Even when I try, I am not able to get my way. 
_____If I want to, I get to make the decisions. 
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9.0  APPENDIX B 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. 
 
1. I prefer to work without instructions from others. 
 
 
2. Rules and regulations are helpful and necessary for me. 
 
 
3. For me, it is very important to carry out the obligations placed on me. 
 
 
4. I generally solve problems creatively. 
 
 
 
(please turn page) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
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5. I’m not bothered about reviewing or checking things really closely. 
 
6. I like to do things in a new way. 
 
 
7. I always try to make my work as accurate and error-free as possible. 
 
 
8. I like trying out lots of different things, and am often successful in doing so. 
 
(please turn page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
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9. It is important to me that my achievements are recognized and valued by other people. 
 
 
 
10. I often think about what other people expect of me. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
untrue 
not true probably not 
true 
neither true 
nor untrue 
probably 
true 
true definitely 
true 
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10.0  APPENDIX C 
 
Here are some descriptions of different people. Please read each description and think about how much 
each person is like you or is not like you. Please circle the response that shows how much the person in 
the description is like you. 
 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to this person. This person likes to do 
things in his/her own original way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings. This person avoids anything that 
might endanger her/his safety. 
 
 
 
 
3. This person thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. This person always looks 
for new things to try. 
 
 
 
 
(please turn page) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
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4. This person believes that people should do what they’re told. This person thinks people should 
follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. 
 
 
 
 
5. This person thinks it’s important not to ask for more than what you have. This person believes 
that people should be satisfied with what they have. 
 
 
 
 
6. It is important to this person to make his own decisions about what he/she does. This person likes 
to be free and to plan and choose activities for himself/herself. 
 
 
 
 
7. It is very important to this person that her/his country be safe from threats from within and 
without. This person is concerned that social order be protected. 
 
 
 
 
8. This person likes to take risks. This person is always looking for adventures. 
 
 
 
 
(please turn page)
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
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9. It is important to this person to always behave properly. This person wants to avoid doing 
anything people would say is wrong. 
 
 
 
 
10. Religious belief is important to this person. This person tries hard to do what his religion requires. 
 
 
 
 
11. It is important to this person that things be organized and clean. This person doesn’t want things 
to be a mess. 
 
 
 
 
12. This person thinks it’s important to be interested in things. This person likes to be curious and to 
try to understand all sorts of things. 
 
 
 
 
(please turn page) 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
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13. This person believes it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to this person to 
follow the customs he/she has learned. 
 
 
 
 
14. It is important to this person to be obedient. This person believes he/she should always show 
respect to her/his parents and to older people. 
 
 
 
 
15. This person likes surprises. It is important to this person to have an exciting life. 
 
 
 
 
16. This person tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to this person. 
 
 
 
 
 
(please turn page)
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
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17. It is important to this person to be independent. This person likes to rely on himself/herself. 
 
 
 
 
18. Having a stable government is important to this person. This person is concerned that the social 
order be protected. 
 
 
 
 
19. It is important to this person to be polite to other people all the time. This person tries to never 
disturb or irritate others. 
 
 
 
 
20. It is important to this person to be humble and modest. This person tries not to draw attention to 
herself/himself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very much 
like me 
Like me Somewhat 
like me 
A little like 
me 
Not like me Not like me 
at all 
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11.0  APPENDIX D 
Please answer the following questions by circling the answer that best describes you. 
1. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty “worked up.” 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
2. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
3. When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
4. When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
5. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
6. I worry about making mistakes. 
  1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
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7. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
8. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
9. I crave excitement and new sensations. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
10. I go out of my way to get things I want. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
11. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
12. If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
13. I’m always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
14. It would excite me to win a contest. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
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15. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
16. When I go after something I use a “no holds barred” approach. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
17. I often act on the spur of the moment. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
18. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
19. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
 
 
20. I have very few fears compared to my friends. 
1 2 3 4 
Disagree  Slightly disagree Slightly agree  Agree 
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12.0  APPENDIX E 
Goal list sheet A 
Please list any goals that you feel responsible for accomplishing over the course of the next two 
years. Please list as many goals as you can. These can be any kind of goal and can relate to any 
aspect of your life (for example, school, occupation, or social). 
 
1. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. ________________________________________________________________ 
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13.0  APPENDIX F 
Goal list sheet B 
Please list any goals that you would enjoy accomplishing over the course of the next two years. 
Please list as many goals as you can. These can be any kind of goal and can relate to any aspect 
of your life (for example, school, occupation, or social). 
 
1. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. ________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. ________________________________________________________________ 
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14.0  APPENDIX G 
Goal information sheet 
 
Keep in mind the corresponding goal from the goal list sheet A/B when you answer each 
question. 
 
Goal #______ from goal list sheet A/B 
 
Please record the goal here: _________________________________ 
1. How much does this goal focus on getting something that you want? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Completely 
 
 
2. How much does this goal focus on avoiding something that you don’t want? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Completely 
 
 
3. How likely do you think it is that you will be able to accomplish this goal? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly   Quite a bit 
 
 Completely 
 
4. How confident are you about your response to the previous question (about your 
likelihood of accomplishing the goal)? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly   Quite a bit  Completely  
 
 
5. Do you feel you have the ability to accomplish this goal? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Completely 
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6. How confident are you about your response to the previous question (about the extent to 
which you have the ability to accomplish this goal)? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Completely  
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15.0  APPENDIX H 
 
Goal information sheet 
 
Please keep in mind the corresponding goal from the goal list sheet A/B when you answer each 
question. 
Goal #______ from goal list sheet A/B 
 
Please record the goal here: _________________________________ 
1. How important is this goal to you? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Extremely 
 
 
2. How interested in this goal are you? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Extremely 
 
 
3. How motivated are you to achieve this goal? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Extremely 
 
 
4. How confident are you that you will achieve this goal? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Slightly  Quite a bit  Extremely  
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16.0  APPENDIX I 
Perceptions of college tuition 
For this study, I’m interested in your perceptions about the cost of attending college. For each of 
the following colleges or universities, please provide your best estimate about what 1 year of 
“out-of-state” tuition would be at each institution in US dollars as reported by a recent edition of 
US News and World Repots. Please do not include room and board. 
 
Coastal Carolina Community College, Jacksonville, NC: $_________________ 
 
 
University of California, Berkeley, CA: $_________________ 
 
 
Vassar College, Hudson Valley, NY: $_________________ 
 
 
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL: $_________________ 
 
 
Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO: $_________________ 
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Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS: $_________________ 
 
 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN: $_________________ 
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17.0  APPENDIX J 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
1. Overall, how confident do you feel in your performance in the tuition estimation task? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all 
confident 
  Somewhat 
confident 
  Completely 
confident 
 
 
2. How accurate do you think you were in estimating the tuitions? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all 
accurate 
  Somewhat 
accurate 
  Completely 
accurate 
 
 
3. Consider an estimate to be correct if it is within $2000 of the actual tuition. Out of the 7 
total tuitions, how many do you think you got correct? 
 
_______________ 
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19.0  FOOTNOTES 
1 
Informational power is sometimes omitted in discussions of this theory (Raven, Schwarzwald, 
Koslowsky, 1998). 
2
 Participants believed this deception except where noted. 
3
 However, Question #4 always directly followed Question #3 and Question #6 always directly 
followed Question #5, because it seemed logical to consider confidence in an estimate only after 
making that estimate. 
4
 No participants were able to correctly guess the experimental hypotheses. 
5
 Data violated the assumption normality several times throughout the results reported in this 
paper. However, ANOVA is typically resistant to violations of assumptions (see discussion in 
Kenny & Judd (1986)). Additionally, when this occurred, a Kruskal-Wallis test (which does not 
rely on the same assumptions as parametric tests like ANOVA) was run and each time indicated 
the same pattern of results as the corresponding ANOVA. 
6
 Because participants only listed three goals of each type, their level of confidence about 
accomplishing each goal should not be affected by listing different numbers of goals, as 
appeared to be the case in Study 1. 
7 When testing this relationship with Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping methodology 
similar results were obtained. 
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8
 Again, similar results were obtained when using a bootstrapping methodology (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). 
9
 Edwards (1995) described analyses designed to eliminate the problems inherent in the analysis 
of difference scores as dependent measures. However, these procedures involve creating and 
analyzing subsections of data. In the case of the current data sets, some subsections contained too 
few cases for a reasonable analysis. Consequently, this procedure was not carried out. 
 
